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ABSTRACT
Essays on Strategic Risk Management
BY
Sampan Nettayanun
March 31, 2014
Committee Co-Chair: Martin F. Grace and George H. Zanjani
Major Academic Unit: Department of Risk Management and Insurance
The goal of the first part of the dissertation is to explore the effects of the competition and mar-
ket structure on the hedging strategies of companies within the property and liability insurance
industry. Based on the available data (1989 to 2009), there is empirical evidence that insurers take
competition and market structure into consideration in implementing their risk management poli-
cies. Market power, market positioning, diversification of lines and states, intensity of competition
and the level of hedging in the industry all affect reinsurance purchase decisions. These results are
robust under various econometric specifications.
The second part of the dissertation explores whether risk management adds value to the property
and liability insurers. Moreover, it studies whether risk management adds value to insurance com-
panies with good underwriting skills. Using the property and liability insurance data for the years
1989 to 2011, there is evidence that ceding a high proportion of the risks decreases profit efficiency
iii
of insurers in general. In addition, there is evidence that using a very high level of hedging does
not prove to be profitable for the insurers with an underwriting edge.
Finally, the last part studies strategic similarities within the property and liability insurance in-
dustry from 1989 to 2011. I find nine common strategic groups during the stable strategic time
periods. The levels of performance, risk management, and predation vary among the strategic
groups. Some strategic groups exhibit unique patterns of risk management compared to the in-
dustry as a whole. Moreover, the positioning within strategic groups influences the insurers’ risk
management activities. In addition, I find relationships among insurers’ risk management tools.
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CHAPTER 1
Strategic Risk Management
in the Property and Liability Insurance Industry
1.1. Introduction
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), risk management adds no value to firms when
there is no friction. However, by adding frictions to the framework, risk management becomes
a constructive part of a company. Previous empirical studies, such as Mayers and Smith (1990),
Tufano (1996), Dionne and Garand (2003) and Cole and McCullough (2006) focus their attention
on financial considerations, such as agency cost, tax, firm size, costs of external financing, financial
distress, organization form and the reinsurance market conditions. This study considers the existing
literature by exploring frictions from the competition and the market structure that influence
underwriting risk management in the property and liability insurance industry.
Maksimovic and Zechner (1991), Allayannis and Ihrig (2001), Mello and Ruckes (2008), Adam,
Dasgupta, and Titman (2007) and Liu and Parlour (2009) present theoretical models of how market
structure and competition factors affect risk management. In addition, there are several empirical
studies that test these hypotheses such as Allayannis and Ihrig (2001), MacKay and Phillips (2005)
and Adam and Nain (2013). These studies use non-financial firms to test their hypotheses. What
makes my study stands out from these empirical studies is that it is the first to use financial firms.
This study uses the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) data from 1989 to
2009 of P&L insurers. By covering a 21-year period of data, my study eliminates any bias in the
results toward any particular short period of time or any cycles that might over-influence hedging
decisions. It also takes into account all the possible frictions within the industry for analysis.
This study shows that during 1989 to 2009, insurers took financial, competition, market struc-
ture and reinsurance market conditions into consideration when making hedging decisions. For the
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financial considerations, assets have a negative relationship with the hedging level, supporting the
view that larger insurers get external financing more easily than their peers. Leverage also has
a negative relationship with the hedging level, as supported by Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan
(2014) who state that having more leverage or less resource reduces incentive to hedge. The study
also finds that loss development has a positive relationship to the hedging level, suggesting that
firms in a distress situation cede more risk. My analysis demonstrates that tax has a negative
relationship with the hedging level. However, this is in contradiction to the view of Smith and
Stulz (1985) that the smoothness of income from hedging on the tax payment benefits insurers.
One possible explanation is that the tax schedule in reality might not be strictly convex as Smith
and Stulz (1985) assume. Therefore, the tax and hedging relationship do not need to exhibit a
positive relationship.
Besides financial consideration effects on hedging, competition and market structure play roles
in risk management as well. My results show that market share has a negative relationship with
hedging, which can be explained by Mello and Ruckes (2008). Insurers with higher market power or
a higher competitive edge tend to hedge less to take advantage of their power in the market. This
study finds that the Herfindahl Index by lines of business and by states has a negative correlation
to the level of risk management. In addition, more focused insurers tend to hedge less, following
the implication of the theory by Mello and Ruckes (2008). Companies who operate in less lines of
business might have a competitive edge for those particular lines and, therefore, partially hedge.
This is supported by Froot (2007) who states that insurers should hedge completely on the risks
where they do not have a competitive edge. They retain the risk where they have an edge over
their competitors.
The study also finds that the number of insurers and the concentration by state have a positive
and a negative relationship with hedging, respectively. The evidence supports Allayannis and Ihrig
(2001) and Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007) who observe that the intensity of competition
increases the level of hedging. At times when the intensity of competition is high, companies have
more incentive to hedge as they have a higher chance to become insolvent. My study demonstrates
that the hedging of each insurer has a positive relationship with the industry’s hedging level,
which may suggest that the hedging level of the industry affects individual hedging decisions. On
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average, individual insurers appear to follow the trend of hedging of the industry as a whole. The
insurers that rely on brokerage networks at a different level from their peers seem to hedge less.
However, Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) suggest that companies can substitute financial hedging
with investing in technology at a similar level to their peers. One possible explanation is again from
the discussion of Mello and Ruckes (2008) and Froot (2007). Insurers that do not use brokerage
networks might tend to sell their policies by themselves, and as a result they have their own edge
and are confident of the risk they write. This is similar to Berger, Cummins, and Weiss (1997)
who note that insurers who implement direct selling in-house have higher revenue efficiency than
insurers who use independent agents. Therefore, they do not need to hedge the risk as much,
compared to the insurers that use brokers.
The structure of this paper is organized as follows: First, I identify and discuss the possible
factors that affect hedging. Second, I describe the data used in this study. Third, I conduct an
empirical investigation to test which factors affect risk management. Lastly, I summarize the study.
1.2. Risk Management in the P&L Insurance Industry
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), risk management adds no value to firms in the
market where there is no friction. However, risk management adds value when introducing frictions
into the framework. Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that there are several factors that influence a
firm’s hedging decisions. These factors include taxation, contracting costs, and managerial behavior.
In addition, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) explain the expensive cost of external financing
that leads management to develop different hedging policies. For example, the larger size firms
have less asymmetric information problems, and are, therefore, expected to have less problems
associated with the costs of external financing. The hedging levels in larger firms are, therefore,
expected to be smaller. Following the theories about the influences on company hedging by Smith
and Stulz (1985) and Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), Tufano (1996) shows that managerial
behavior influences the hedging level in the gold mining industry and that gold mining companies
hedge more if the management owns more shares of the company. Moreover, firms hedge less if
the management team has more options in the company. A further empirical study in the gold
mining industry, by Dionne and Garand (2003), using the same analysis as Tufano (1996), found
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that tax, financial distress, the cost of external financing and the ownership by managers all affect
hedging decisions. However, these studies mainly focus on the financial factors that affect the risk
management of the firms involved.
In addition to the effects of financial considerations on hedging decisions, competition and
market structure also play key roles. According to Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) and MacKay
and Phillips (2005), firms tend to compare their investment in technology to their peers within the
industry. The level of financial hedging is reduced if the investment in technology is close to their
peers, because the financial outcomes are going to be similar. Nain (2005), Adam, Dasgupta, and
Titman (2007) and Mello and Ruckes (2008) predict that industry factors, such as the number of
companies, the intensity of competition and the level of hedging of the whole industry all play a role
in hedging decisions. Moreover, Liu and Parlour (2009) argue that firms with a better chance to
win new business will be in a riskier situation if they do not hedge. Therefore, firms with a higher
chance to win business tend to hedge more. In the same spirit as Allayannis and Ihrig (2001),
MacKay and Phillips (2005) and Adam and Nain (2013), I will consider the effects of the market
structure and competition on hedging activities. However, I will do this through the lens of the
P&L insurance companies.
Next, I will explain each friction that could possibly lead insurers to hedge differently, and I
will look at the relationship with its hedging level. I separate the effects into three categories, which
are financial considerations, competition considerations and the state of the US reinsurance market.
I will now discuss the variables that are possibly associated with the insurer’s risk management
strategy.
1.2.1. Financial Consideration for Risk Management.
• Cost of External Financing: According to Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), higher
costs of external financing lead to more hedging. I expect the cost of capital to rise if the debt rating
is at a distressed level. I have ranked the cost of external capital for each company using the rating
from A.M. Best. If the rating starts with A, then the cost of external capital score is 1. If the rating
starts with B, then the cost of external capital score is 2, etc. According to Froot, Scharfstein, and
Stein (1993), firms with a specific project to invest in will likely use risk management to protect
themselves from obtaining expensive external financing. Therefore, I expect to see more hedging
4
activity when the cost of external financing is higher. I call this variable COSTCAP . Another
variable that captures the cost of external capital is an unobserved propensity to fail, according to
Grace and Leverty (2012). Similar to the rating by A.M. Best, if an insurer has a higher propensity
to fail, it is harder for the insurer to obtain external financing. I call this variable PFail.
Accumulative knowledge that is related to a company’s formulation of its strategy, includes in-
formation about its position and its competitors. Examples of accumulated knowledge, as discussed
by Fiegenbaum and Thomas (2004), also include knowledge arising from strong brands, reputation
and innovation. COSTCAP (from the previous section) is the variable that I use to represent the
reputation of insurer. A low COSTCAP variable means that the company is in a good shape and,
therefore, has a stronger reputation among the capital provider. It gives the policyholders confi-
dence in the company. On the other hand, a high COSTCAP variable means that the company
is in distress. Hence, it will be harder to raise capital as investors will be reluctant to lend. In
addition, the policy buyers will have less confidence to buy policies from a failing company.
• Firm Size: The relationship between asset and risk management activity is ambiguous
from a theoretical point of view. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and Tufano (1996) argue
that smaller firms have higher asymmetric information problems than the larger firms, at least for
financing activities. The agency cost is higher for smaller insurers. Hence, in a soft market, smaller
insurers need to protect themselves from the costs of outside financing by having protection of
the underwriting risk. We should expect to see smaller firms more involved in risk management.
Therefore, we should expect to have a negative relationship between firm size and risk management.
Mayers and Smith (1990) find a negative relationship between size and the level of risk management
of P&L insurers. Controlling for the log of the admitted asset, Hoyt and Khang (2000) also find a
negative relationship between firm size and the amount of reinsurance purchased.
According to Liu and Parlour (2009), however, a firm is likely to hedge more if it expects to
win new business. The firm will not hedge as much if it does not have enough available resource to
take on a new business. This is because the firm will be in an overhedged position if it cannot win
the business. The hedging position of a small firm will be wasted. In order to win new business, the
firm will put in the effort to bid more. Hedging creates value for the firm if it wins new business.
Since a bigger firm has more capacity and resource to win over the competition due to its scale in
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its setting, it can be expected to see a positive relationship between its size and hedging level. In
addition, Stulz (1996) argues that the actual corporate use of derivatives does not align with the
theory that larger firms hedge less than smaller firms. Large firms seem to have a higher hedging
level than small firms. For all these reasons, it is interesting to empirically explore the relationship
between firm size and hedging level. I use the log of the book value of assets as the measure of each
firm’s size. I call this variable ASSET .
• Tax: Smith and Stulz (1985), Stulz (1996) and Graham and Smith (1999) argue that a
convex tax schedule leads to more hedging. Without hedging, a firm will have high volatility of
income. Hence, the tax will be very high in high income years, and very low or zero in low income
or loss years. Hedging will lower the volatility of the income. Hence, the theory predicts that on
average, firms that hedge will pay less tax. Therefore, the value of the firm increases. Tufano
(1996) uses the tax loss carried forward to check the relationship with the hedging level. He finds
no apparent relationship between the tax loss carried forward and the hedging level. Dionne and
Garand (2003) use both deferred tax, divided by assets, and the tax saved, as used by Graham
and Smith (1999) to be their measure of the tax. They find evidence that both have a significant
impact on the hedging levels of gold mining companies. Cole and McCullough (2006) use tax-
exempt investment income, divided by the total investment income, to capture the tax effect on
the reinsurance purchase level of P&L insurers. They do not find a relationship between the tax
and the level of risk management. I use the federal and foreign income tax incurred, divided by
the book value of assets, as a measure of relevance of tax on hedging. If the ratio between total
income tax and book value of the asset is high, then managers tend to consider corporate income
tax as a factor of the hedging level. Therefore, I expect to see a positive relationship between tax
and the hedging level. I call this variable TAX.
• Financial Distress and Leverage: Tufano (1996) and Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) use
leverage to determine the level of risk management of firms. Both argue that low leverage can
act as a substitute to the amount of the firm’s hedging level. When the insurers are in a distress
situation or have high leverage, they tend to buy more reinsurance. Taksar and Markussen (2003)
argue that firms with a high level of capital or a low level of leverage tend to have a lower level
of reinsurance. I expect an inverse relationship between the leverage and the hedging level. On
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the other hand, Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014) argue that the firms with more financial
constraints in a distressed situation will have less incentive and resource to buy more insurance
products. It will be interesting to empirically see how the leverage and the financial distress play
a role in the decisions for risk management. I use the ratio of the book value of the total liability
over the total book value of assets, as used in the study by Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011). I call this
variable LEV ERAGE.
In addition to the LEV ERAGE variable, I also use the loss development to capture the
distress of the company. According to Cole and McCullough (2006), an insurer that has positive
loss development over the previous years has been under-reserved. Therefore, the insurer is in a
distressed situation and requires more reinsurance contracts. I use the one-year loss development
and loss expenses incurred, divided by total book value of assets, expressed as LOSSDEV E.
• Under Investment Problem: Under an assumption that a company finances its project
only with equity, the firm should take the project when the net present value of the project is non-
negative. However, if the capital structure consists of risky debt, there will be an underinvestment
problem according to Myers (1977) and Mayers and Smith (1987). If the project turns out to be
in a bad state, the firm will more likely go in to bankruptcy. The firm might have to forgo some
investment opportunities due to the risky debt in the capital structure. The insurer can protect itself
from falling into crisis by partially purchasing reinsurance contracts. Mayers and Smith (1990) and
Powell and Sommer (2007) use leverage to test the hypothesis. They expect insurers with higher
leverage to consider purchasing more reinsurance contracts. The higher leverage ratio indicates a
higher probability that the insurer will go to bankruptcy. In addition, Cole and McCullough (2006)
use profitability to capture the effect of underinvestment problems. They hypothesize that insurers
with higher profitability consider purchasing less reinsurance contracts. For this study, I use both
leverage and profitability to capture the problem of underinvestment. The additional variable for
profitability is the return on assets, which is the net income, divided by the total book value of
assets. I call this variable ROA.
• Organizational Form: This study also considers problems of organizational form. Various
studies, such as Mayers and Smith (1981), Lamm-Tennat and Starks (1993), Mayers and Smith
(1994) and Pottier and Sommer (1997) study the impact of organizational form on the risk levels of
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insurers. There are three main types of agents: policy holders, equity holders and managers. These
agents have a conflict of interest according to the different forms of their organizations. This leads
to different levels of risks in different companies. Most of the previous studies indicate that stock
insurers engage in more risky lines of business than the mutual insurers. Therefore, stock insurers
tends to purchase less reinsurance contracts and have higher risk compared to mutual insurers. In
addition, Cole and McCullough (2006) hypothesize that stock insurers can be expected to have
easier access to capital markets. Therefore, it is expected that they have less incentive to buy
reinsurance to protect themselves from distressed conditions. I expect organization structures to
have an impact on the risk management activity of the insurers. I use a dummy variable called
STOCK = 1, if the insurer is a stock company, and STOCK = 0, if it is a mutual company.
1.2.2. Market Structure and Competition Effect on Risk Management.
I will now discuss the possible variables that capture the interdependence of insurers.
• Market Share: Managers compare their companies’ position to competitors within the
industry. For example, Fiegenbaum and Thomas (2004) argue that managers use other firms as a
reference point before formulating a strategy. Market share is a good measure of a firm’s positioning
in the industry. According to Sommer (1996), the bigger companies tend to be healthier than the
smaller ones in the insurance industry. This implies that customers are more willing to buy policies
from the insurers with a bigger market share. The bigger insurers can charge higher prices than
the smaller firms and face a lower insolvency risk. According to Mello and Ruckes (2008), firms
with a competitive edge over their competitors tend to hedge less. By having the advantage of
charging higher prices than the smaller players in the industry, insurers with a larger market share
have less incentive to hedge. I expect to see a negative relationship between market share and the
level of hedging. I call this variable Marketshare to represent the market share. The market share
is defined as,
MarketShareit =
Net premium written of the insurer i at time t∑n
j=1 (Net premium written of the company j at time t)
(1.2.1)
where n is the total number of insurers in the industry.
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• Diversification: Similar to Mayers and Smith (1990), Choi and Weiss (2005), Cole and
McCullough (2006) and Leverty and Grace (2010), I have measured the concentration of the lines
of business and the states they operate in, using the Herfindahl index to express both states and
lines of business. The Herfindahl index has been used to characterize the market of each insurance
company in terms of geography and business type. The state Herfindahl index for each company
can be written as,
HerfindahlStateit =
n∑
j=1
(% share of direct premium written in state j at time t)2 (1.2.2)
where n is the total number of states. Under this definition, it represents several characteristics.
First, if the HerfindahlState is high, it means the company is focusing on particular states. On
the other hand, if the HerfindahlState is low, the company has diversified itself to many states,
but might face more competition in many states compared to businesses with a higher value of the
index. The insurer that has more concentration can enjoy the benefit of reinsurance as a means
to diversify itself. However, the insurer that has less concentration does not need to buy more
reinsurance.
Similar to the state Herfindahl index, the line Herfindahl index measures the concentration of
competition by lines of insurance. I use the net premium written, instead of the direct premium,
for the line Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl index by line captures the market structure of each
company by line of business. The HerfindahlLine is defined as,
HerfindahlLineit =
m∑
k=1
(% share of net premium written in line k at time t)2 (1.2.3)
where k is the index for each line. The insurer with greater concentration can enjoy the benefits
of reinsurance as a means to diversify itself. However, the insurer with less concentration does not
need to buy more reinsurance. Cole and McCullough (2006) find that both Herfindahl by line of
business and by state have a negative relationship with the hedging level of insurers. So, there is
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evidence that the diversification of lines and the geography have an impact on risk management
decisions. We will see how insurers react to their own diversification in this study.
• Level of Hedging in the Industry: According to Nain (2005) and Adam, Dasgupta,
and Titman (2007), firms decide to hedge according to the level of hedging within the industry1.If
the overall level of hedging in the industry is high, firms might not want to hedge on the revenue
or cost volatility as much, to take advantage of their flexibility to produce. On the other hand, a
company might hedge more if the benefit of the flexibility to produce is lower, compared to hedging.
Therefore, it is interesting to see how the level of hedging of the industry as a whole affects the
decisions made by individual insurers. I have measured the level of hedging of the industry for each
year by calculating the median of the variable Hedge. I call this variable IndHedging.
• Number of Firms: Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007) predict that when there are more
companies within the industry, the incentive to hedge increases. One possible explanation to this
is that a higher numbers of firms within the industry push down the margin between price and
cost, and as a result, unhedged firms are likely to suffer as a result of the cost shock. Similar to
the findings of Allayannis and Ihrig (2001), firms in a more competitive environment find it hard
to adjust price according to changes in cost. Hence, firms in a more competitive landscape are
exposed to more risks, and they tend to hedge more. On the other hand, Mello and Ruckes (2008)
argue that the firms that tend to hedge less may be more exposed to competitive market conditions,
but can benefit more from a higher cash flow state. This is in line with Adam and Nain (2013)
who find that hedging has a negative relationship with the intensity of competition. I capture the
competition level by considering the number of firms. I take a log of the number of insurers for each
year to avoid the influence of magnitude of this variable, since there are more than 2,000 insurers
each year. I call this variable NumIns, representing the total number of insurers at a given time.
• Intensity of Competition in the Industry: I capture the level of competition through
the level of concentration within the industry. Similar to the relationship to the number of firms,
we should expect that the level of hedging increases with the level of intensity of competition,
according to Allayannis and Ihrig (2001) and Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007). However, if
1Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007) assume that each firm in the model decide to hedge fully or does not hedge
at all.
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the competition is intense, firms tend to hedge less, according to Mello and Ruckes (2008) and
Adam and Nain (2013). Therefore, it is interesting to see the relationship between hedging and
competition intensity. To capture the level of concentration in the industry, I use the method
developed by Montgomery (1985) and followed by Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) to capture the
industry concentration. First, I calculate the Herfindahl index for each line of business using the
relationship,
Herfjt =
n∑
i=1
(
NPWijt
NPWjt
)2
(1.2.4)
NPWijt is the net premium written for a company i on line j at time t. NPWjt is the
particular line j total net premium written in the year t. Then we can find the weight for each line
of business j for each insurer i by,
weightijt =
NPWijt
NPWjt
(1.2.5)
Therefore, a firm’s exposure to the industry competition can be calculated as,
IndHerfLineit =
∑
j
weightijt ∗Herfjt. (1.2.6)
Each firm has its own intensity of exposure in the industry. The larger the value of IndHerfLineit,
the higher the concentration of competition the firm i faces at a given time t. In addition to the
concentration by lines of business, I also calculate the concentration of the Herfindahl index by
geography. I call this variable IndHerfState.
• Positioning in the Industry: Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) argue that the levels of
risk management are based on the investment of technology by the insurers. The study implies
that firms that have a similar level of technology have similar profit outcomes compared to their
competitors, and therefore, have higher leverage than firms that have much higher or much lower
technology than the industry. MacKay and Phillips (2005) shows that there is a reverse relationship
of the differences from the median of industry’s technology and debt level. These studies are in
line with Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1995) where firms use a reference point to measure how it is
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doing compared to its peers. A firm’s strategy changes according to its reference point. This study
follows the approach of MacKay and Phillips (2005) to find the relationship of a firm’s position in
its industry and its risk management activity. I expect to see a positive relationship between the
positioning and the risk management in the industry, if the prediction based on the theory is right.
In contrast to MacKay and Phillips (2005), an insurance company’s capital usage is extensively
based on human capital rather than fixed assets2. In this study, I use five measures of technology
in considering the needs of insurance companies: 1) total salary, divided by total expense, 2) total
agent expense, divided by total expense, 3) total brokerage expense, divided by total expense, 4)
total data equipment and software assets, divided by total assets. 5) total advertising expense,
divided by total expense. Using a similar method to MacKay and Phillips (2005), I define the
positioning variable for each technology by using the following equation,
Positioningi,t =
|technologyi,t −median(∀jtechnologyj,t)|
max
h
[|technologyh,t −median(∀jtechnologyj,t)|] . (1.2.7)
where i is for the firm i, j is all the firms within the industry and t is for the year t. This
positioning (for each technology) is the measure of how far each company invests in its technology
in comparison to the median of the industry, divided by the range of the distance from the industry.
• Product Type: According to Winter (1994), the price of insurance depends on the type
of the line of business each insurer offers. The theory implies that the price of more risky lines
are expected to be higher. Therefore, the cost of acquiring a reinsurance contract in those lines
tends to be higher. Hence, the incentive for buying insurance contracts for those particular lines of
business tend to be lower. Therefore, it is expected that those product types have an impact on risk
management activity. In addition, elasticity of demand and convexity of production costs of the
products influence hedging activity, according to Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007). Therefore,
we expect that each product type will affect hedging activity differently. Mayers and Smith (1990)
and Cole and McCullough (2006) also control for the product type in their studies of the demand
by reinsurers for reinsurance contracts. Instead of controlling for each line of business, I categorize
the lines into four categories, in a similar manner to the study by Phillips, Cummins, and Allen
2MacKay and Phillips (2005) analyzes the positioning and debt level of companies that are not in the financial
industry. They mainly focus on the use of capital invested in fixed assets, such factories or properties.
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(1998), according to the Table 1.1. For each category of business, I define these variables with their
respective net premium written in each category, divided by the total premium written.
1.2.3. Reinsurance Market Specific Effects on Risk Management.
According to Cole and McCullough (2006), the condition of the reinsurance market has an
effect on the level of the hedging strategy by the primary insurers. In this study, I define reinsurers
as the businesses that assume a premium from their non-affiliates, which represent more than 75%
of their direct business, including the reinsurance that is assumed from their affiliates. This is
similar to the definition used by Cole and McCullough (2006). I will now discuss the variables that
will be included for the reinsurance market.
• Price: Cole and McCullough (2006) conjecture that the price of reinsurance contracts has
an effect on decisions to hedge, made by insurers. For example, a shock on the loss can limit the
supply of the insurance contract, according to Winter (1994), Cummins and Danzon (1997) and
Weiss and Chung (2004). After a wide loss, the price of the reinsurance contract is expected to
increase, which discourages primary insurers from buying. Furthermore, Cole and McCullough
(2006) find that the relationship between the reinsurance price and the hedging level are negative.
This evidence suggests that the cost of reinsurance will deter the willingness to hedge. In my study,
I use the ratio of the net premium written to the incurred losses for the current year as the measure
of the price for reinsurers. The price variable for the reinsurance market is calculated by using
the average price weighted by the net premium written of each reinsurer. The variable is called
RePrice.
• Development of Loss Reserves: Cole and McCullough (2006) hypothesize that a ceding
company will buy more(less) if the health of reinsurers is better(worse). Cummins and Danzon
(1997) also suggest that the price of the insurance contracts will depend on the credibility of the
reinsurers. This is because insurers have to take responsible for losses if the reinsurers become
insolvent. Therefore, they need to buy policies from financially sound policy sellers. Cole and
McCullough (2006) use the loss development to gauge this factor of the insurer’s hedging decision.
However, they do not find any relationship between the risk management level and the loss devel-
opment among reinsurers. For this study, I still consider loss development to test the health of the
reinsurance market. I use one year of loss development, divided by the total book value of assets of
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the reinsurers for each year to indicate whether the reinsurers are financially sound. This approach
is similar to the variable used by Cole and McCullough (2006). I have shown the loss development
for each reinsurer, and have also calculated the averaged loss development for the whole reinsurance
industry weighted by the net premium written. This variable will be called ReLossDeve.
• Liquidity: Cole and McCullough (2006) argue that there are two reasons that the liquidity
of reinsurers influence their hedging decisions. First, if the overall reinsurance market has more
liquid assets, for example, cash and invested assets, scaled by liabilities, then the whole reinsurance
market will tend to be more stable. Therefore, a stable market creates more incentive for primary
insurers to buy insurance. In addition, liquidity is a sign of excess capacity in the reinsurance
market. Hence, reinsurers are more willing to sell reinsurance to insurers, and the price of the
insurance will be low compared to the lower liquidity environment. Under this excess liquidity
condition, we should see that insurers tend to buy more reinsurance contracts. However, Cole and
McCullough (2006) do not empirically find any relationship between liquidity of the reinsurers and
the level of hedging of the insurers. I use the liquidity of the whole reinsurance industry as a variable
for the level of hedging by insurers. Similar to the method used by Cole and McCullough (2006),
I use the average cash and invested assets, divided by the total liability to measure the liquidity of
the reinsurers weighted by the net premium written. This variable will be called ReLiquidity.
1.3. Hedging Level
This section defines the insurers’ hedging level. I use data from the Underwriting and In-
vestment (Exhibit Part 1B) to measure the hedging level. The reinsurance ceded is the sum of
Column 4 and 5. These include the ceded premiums to affiliates and non-affiliates. The total gross
premium is the sum of Column 1, 2 and 3. These columns include the direct business written, and
reinsurance assumed from affiliates and non-affiliates. I denote the premium ceded, divided by the
total premium written as Hedge.
In summary, the test will follow the equation,
Hedgeit = α+ βXit + γZt + it, (1.3.1)
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where,
Hedgeit = reinsurance ceded/(total direct premium written + reinsurance assumed)
Xit = a vector of all the controlled variables which assumed to be exogenous for the
ith insurer in year t.
Zt = a vector of all reinsurance condition effect variables in year t
The controlled variables and the expected sign of relevance to the risk management level are
in Table 1.2.
1.4. Data
In this section, I explore the empirical evidence for factors that will have effects on the risk
management activity in the P&L insurance industry using the NAIC data. The study focuses on
each insurer individually, not at a group level. There are four outliers of the ceding level, which
I expect to be the insurers who are liquidating or having accounting errors. Therefore, I have
eliminated those observations. In total, there are 23,671 observations throughout the period of
1989 to 2009. The summary statistics for each variable are in Table 1.3. On average, insurers
ceded about 38% during the period. This is in line with the median level of ceding which is about
35%.
1.5. Empirical Methodology
There are four main econometric issues that I need to address. First, the data is panel data
because it consists of each company’s variables and time period. Second, the panel data is not
balanced, which means that the number of unique IDs will be different for each year. Third, there
might be a firm’s specific characteristic effect. Fourth, I assume that the independent variables
on the right-hand side of the equation are all exogenous. To tackle all these requirements, I fitted
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random effects and fixed effects into the model. To compare with the previous studies based
only on the financial considerations of hedging, such as Tufano (1996), I fitted the model with
only financial consideration variables. Next, I fitted the model with all the variables that I have
discussed. For each model, I use the Haussman test to choose between the random-effect regression
and the fixed-effect regression. The result from the regressions is in the next section.
1.6. Multivariate Results
According to Table 1.4, the first and second panels, study the effects of financial considerations
on risk management. The first panel shows a random-effect regression, whereas, the second panel
shows a fixed-effect regression. According to the first two panels, the Haussman test gives the χ2
statistics of 153.94 and the p-value of 0.000. Hence, it rejects the null hypothesis that the use of
random-effect regression is appropriate. Therefore, I have focused on interpreting the results of the
financial considerations on the risk management in Panel (2), which is the fixed-effect regression.
According to the result, leverage has a negative relationship with the hedging level. This finding
supports the view of Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014) that insurers who have more leverage
or less resource will have less incentive to hedge. Loss development has a positive relationship to
the hedging level. This result suggests that insurers in distressed situations cede more risks. Tax
has a negative relationship with hedging. The result contradicts Smith and Stulz (1985) who argue
that the smoothness of income from hedging on the tax payment will benefit insurers. One possible
explanation is that the tax schedule in the insurance industry might not be strictly convex, as
Smith and Stulz (1985) assume. Therefore, the tax and hedging relationship do not need to exhibit
a positive relationship.
Now, we turn attention to the last two panels of the regressions. Panel (3) and (4) take into
account the competition and the market structure of the P&L insurance industry and the health
of the US reinsurance market. Panel (3) shows a random-effect regression. Panel (4) shows a
fixed-effect regression. The Haussman test gives the χ2 statistics of 214.99 and the p-value of
0.0057. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis that the random-effect panel regression is an
appropriate model to fit this data. Hence, we focus on the interpretation of our result in Panel (4).
The relationships of financial variables and hedging is similar to Panel (2).
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Assets have a negative relationship with the hedging level, supporting Tufano (1996) who
suggests that larger firms can get external financing more easily than their peers, and, therefore,
have less incentive to hedge. Leverage, loss development and tax provide the same effect as the
case where I consider the financial factors alone. Looking at the competition and market structure
side, market share has a negative relationship with hedging. This supports the study by Mello
and Ruckes (2008). Insurers with higher market power or competitive edge tend to hedge less to
take advantage of their power in the market. The Herfindahl index figures by line of business and
the Herfindahl index figures by state have negative relationships to the level of risk management.
More focused insurers tend to hedge less. This can be explained by Mello and Ruckes (2008).
Insurers, who operate in a particular line of business, might have a competitive edge, such as better
customer service and reduced costs associated with searching for products for customers, compared
to their competitors. Therefore, those businesses do not need to hedge as much, compared to more
diversified insurers. The result is also in line with the study by Froot (2007). Insurers should hedge
completely to avoid risk where they do not have an edge. They retain the risk where they have an
edge over their competitors.
The number of insurers and the concentration by states have a positive and negative relation-
ship with hedging, respectively. This evidence supports the findings of Allayannis and Ihrig (2001)
and Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007) that the intensity of competition increases the level of
hedging. In periods where intensity of competition is high, insurers have more incentive to hedge
because they have more chance to become insolvent. Therefore, hedging has a positive relationship
with the industry’s hedging level. It possibly implies that the hedging level of the industry affects
individual hedging decisions. On average, insurers appear to go with the trend of hedging as an
industry. Out of five positioning variables, there is only one that has a significant relationship with
underwriting risk management. The positioning on brokerage network has a negative relationship
with hedging. This result contradicts a prediction by Maksimovic and Zechner (1991). One pos-
sible explanation is, again, from the discussion of Mello and Ruckes (2008) and Froot (2007) that
insurers that do not use brokerage networks tend to sell their policies directly themselves. They
have their own edge on selling policies and are confident about the risk they write. This is similar
to the view of Berger, Cummins, and Weiss (1997) that the insurers who implement direct selling
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in-house have higher revenue efficiency than insurers who use independent agents to sell them.
Therefore, they might not need to hedge the risks as much as the insurers who use brokers.
The analysis also investigates the correlation between the conditions of the reinsurance market
and the ceding levels of insurers. Cole and McCullough (2006) predict that hedging should have
a reverse relationship with loss development in the reinsurance market. However, my findings
indicate that hedging has a positive relationship with loss development in the reinsurance market.
This might imply that reinsurers who are in a distressed situation tend to offer lower prices to
gain more customers. Therefore, this increases the incentive for primary insurers to increase the
purchase of reinsurance contracts. This is similar to the argument presented by Phillips and Sertsios
(2013) who suggest that firms in a distressed situation tend to adjust price, quality and quantity
of their products to survive.
1.7. Conclusion
In addition to the previous literature that explores why insurers have different hedging levels,
I add competition and the market structure of the industry into the framework. Analysis of the
available data (from 1989 to 2009), shows that insurers took financial factors, competition, market
structure and the reinsurance market conditions into consideration when making risk management
decisions. There is evidence that financial considerations, such as size, leverage, loss development
and tax, influence hedging decisions. In addition, the evidence suggest that the competition and
market structure influence hedging decisions, as expected.
The market power, market positioning, diversification of lines, intensity of competition and
the level of hedging within the industry all play roles in risk management decisions. Insurers with a
competitive edge, by having higher market power, rely on brokers differently from their peers, and
by being more focused on lines of business, they tend to hedge less. This supports the studies by
Froot (2007) and Mello and Ruckes (2008) that observe that firms with a competitive edge have less
incentive to hedge. There is also evidence that a higher intensity of competition increases the level
of hedging, as predicted by Allayannis and Ihrig (2001) and Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007).
By hedging within a more competitive market, insurers have less chance to fall into bankruptcy.
It, therefore, appears that the hedging levels of the industry have a positive relationship with the
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firm’s hedging decisions. This might suggest that the flexibility of production within insurance
industry benefits insurers less than hedging.
The study implies that considering financial variables as the main driver for risk management
does not provide a complete picture. Competition and market structure also influence the hedging
decisions. The result confirms the findings of MacKay and Phillips (2005) and Adam and Nain
(2013) that competition and market structure play roles in risk management activity. Therefore,
risk managers in the insurance industry have to take into account these factors when implementing
corporate risk management strategies.
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Table 1.2. All Variables of Interest
Factors Variable Names Descriptions Categories Expected Signs
Strategy HEDGE Premium ceded/Total premium written Strategy/Conduct
Financial
Consideration
COSTCAP Rating from A.M. Best Cost of External Financ-
ing/Reputation
+/-
PFail Propensity to fail Cost of External Financ-
ing
+/-
ASSET Natural log of book value of total assets Firm Size +/-
LEV ERAGE Book value of total debt/Book value of
total assets
Financial Distress and
Leverage
+/-
LOSSDEV E One year loss development/Book value of
assets
Financial Distress and
Leverage
+/-
TAX Total income tax/Book value of total as-
sets
Tax +
STOCK 1 if stock and 0 mutual Organizational Form -
ROA Net income/Book value of total assets Investment Incentive -
Market Structure
& Competition
MarketShare Market share by net premium written Market Position -
ShortTailCom Total gross premium on short-tail com-
mercial/Total gross premium on all the
lines
Product Type +/-
LongTailCom Total gross premium on long-tail com-
mercial/Total gross premium on all the
lines
Product Type +/-
ShortTailPer Total gross premium on short-tail per-
sonal/Total gross premium on all the
lines
Product Type +/-
LongTailPer Total gross premium on long-tail per-
sonal/Total gross premium on all the
lines
Product Type +/-
HerfindahlLine The measurement of the diversification of
the product lines for each insurer
Diversification/Competitors +/-
HerfindahlState The measurement of the geographic di-
versification for each insurer
Diversification/Competitors +/-
HerfIndLine The measurement of the exposure to the
intensity of competition by product lines
Intensity of Competition +/-
HerfIndState The measurement of the exposure to the
intensity of competition by geography
Intensity of Competition +/-
NumIns Number of insurers Intensity of Competition +
IndHedging Median of the industry’s hedging level Intensity of Competition +/-
PosSalary Positioning based on salary expenses Positioning +
PosAgent Positioning based on agent expenses Positioning +
PosBroker Positioning based on broker expenses Positioning +
PosAdver Positioning based on advertising ex-
penses
Positioning +
PosSoftware Positioning based on electronic and soft-
ware investment
Positioning +
Insurance
Specific Effect
RePrice Net premium written/Incurred losses of
reinsurers
Reinsurance Market’s
Price
-
ReLossDeve Average 1 year loss development for the
reinsurers/Book value of total assets
Reinsurers’ Strength -
ReLiquidity Cash and invested assets/Total liability
of the reinsurance industry
Reinsurers’ Liquidity +
Note: This table shows the variables that will be included as dependent and independent variables. The first column specifies the
category of the variables. The second column indicates the name of each variable. The third column is the description of how I obtain
each variable from the NAIC data and the A.M. Best data. The fourth column describes how each variable relates to the argument
from previous studies. The last column specifies the relationship between each variable and the hedging level (HEDGE).
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Table 1.3. Summary Statistics of All Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Strategy
HEDGE 0.3834 0.2933 -7.6849 6.8586
Financial Factors
COSTCAP 1.2494 0.5386 1.0000 6.0000
PFAIL 0.0035 0.0219 0.0000 0.9506
ASSET 18.5242 1.7596 13.5693 25.3757
LEVERAGE 0.5937 0.1726 -0.2308 2.5604
LOSSDEVE -0.0054 0.0512 -2.7879 2.1134
TAX 0.0102 0.0202 -0.5406 0.8626
STOCK 0.7477 0.4343 0.0000 1.0000
ROA 0.0274 0.0672 -3.0617 4.0927
Market Structure and Competition Factors
MarketShare 0.0697 0.3501 0.0000 9.1381
ShortTailCom 0.2457 0.3594 -29.8347 4.7274
LongTailCom 0.2870 0.5432 -7.7698 64.3899
ShortTailPer 0.2587 0.3145 -21.7012 2.8160
LongTailPer 0.1748 0.3326 -11.8540 31.2549
HerfindahlLine 0.4097 0.2625 0.0684 1.0000
HerfindahlState 0.5044 0.3746 0.0303 1.0000
HerfIndLine 0.0362 0.0159 0.0085 0.1892
HerfIndState 0.0224 0.0077 0.0094 0.1903
NumIns 7.9073 0.0210 7.8617 7.9484
IndHedging 0.3456 0.0230 0.3075 0.3907
PosSoftware 0.0173 0.0416 0.0000 1.0000
PosBroker 0.0071 0.0090 0.0000 0.2242
PosAgent 0.0018 0.0197 0.0000 0.9805
PosAdver 0.0073 0.0316 0.0000 0.9865
PosSalary 0.0096 0.0144 0.0000 0.2644
Reinsurance Market Factors
Reprice 0.9630 4.1569 -16.8732 3.5364
ReLossDeve 0.0350 0.0897 -0.0066 0.4193
ReLiquidity 1.3085 0.2379 0.8327 1.5440
Note: The summary statistics of all variables are presented. The sample size is 23,671 and the years are from 1989 to 2009.
This table consists of four variable types. The first type is our risk management strategy which is HEDGE. HEDGE is
defined by the premium ceded, divided by total premium written. The financial considerations are COSTCAP , PFAIL,
ASSET , LEV ERAGE, LOSSDEV E, TAX, STOCK and ROA. COSTCAP , is as defined in the previous section, using
A.M. Best rating. PFAIL is the propensity to fail from Grace and Leverty (2012). ASSET is the log of the book value
of total assets. LEV ERAGE is the book value of total debt, divided by the book value of the total assets. LOSSDEV E
is one-year loss development, divided by the book value of the total assets. TAX is the total income tax, divided by the
total book value of the assets. STOCK is a dummy variable, which is 1 if the insurer is a stock company, and 0 if it
is mutual. ROA is defined by the net income, divided by the total book value of the assets. Third, the market structure
and competition variables are Marketshare, ShortTailCom, LongTailCom, ShortTailPer, LongTailPer, HerfindahlLine,
HerfindahlState, HerfIndLine,HerfIndState, NumIns, IndHedging, PosSoftware, PosBroker, PosAgent, PosAdver,
PosSalary. Marketshare is the percentage of market share of each company compared to the whole industry by net premium
written. ShortTailCom, LongTailCom, ShortTailPer, LongTailPer are the product type variables, which are the total
gross premiums on each line, divided by total gross premiums on all the lines. Similarly, HerfindahlLine, HerfindahlState,
HerfIndLine,HerfIndState represent the concentration by firm and industry, as defined in the previous section. NumIns is
the log of the total number of insurers for each year. IndHedging is the median hedging level of the industry. PosSoftware,
PosBroker, PosAgent, PosAdver and PosSalary are a firm’s positioning on software, broker, agent, advertisement and
salary, respectively. Lastly, RePrice, ReLossDeve and ReLiquidity are the variables for the reinsurance market. RePrice is
the weighted average of net premiums written, divided by the losses incurred of the reinsurers. ReLossDeve is the weighted av-
erage of one-year loss development for the reinsurers, divided by the book value of assets for reinsurance policies. ReLiquidity
is the weighted average of cash and invested assets, divided by the total liability of the reinsurers. These weights are based
on the reinsurers’ net premiums written.
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Table 1.4. Multivariate Results for the Year 1989 to 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES RE FE RE FE
COSTCAP -0.0040 0.0024 -0.0041 -0.0017
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
PFAIL 0.0582 0.0383 -0.0071 -0.0602
(0.066) (0.070) (0.065) (0.068)
ASSET -0.0030 -0.0010 -0.0348*** -0.0436***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
LEVERAGE -0.1926*** -0.2222*** -0.1208*** -0.1314***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
LOSSDEVE 0.1551*** 0.1408*** 0.1343*** 0.1248***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
TAX -0.6334*** -0.5804*** -0.4139*** -0.3552***
(0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.078)
STOCK 0.0765*** 0.0208 0.0538*** -0.0036
(0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014)
ROA -0.0218 -0.0174 0.0025 0.0053
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
MarketShare -0.1132*** -0.2026***
(0.015) (0.021)
ShortTailCom -0.0212* -0.0163
(0.012) (0.012)
LongTailCom -0.0122 -0.0086
(0.012) (0.012)
ShortTailPer -0.0262* -0.0200
(0.014) (0.015)
LongTailPer 0.0075 0.0118
(0.013) (0.013)
HerfindahlLine -0.1538*** -0.1449***
(0.010) (0.012)
HerfindahlState -0.1300*** -0.1078***
(0.009) (0.010)
HerfIndLine -0.3489** -0.2066
(0.141) (0.150)
HerfIndState -1.0855*** -1.1934***
(0.254) (0.268)
NumIns 0.5011*** 0.6507***
(0.085) (0.090)
IndHedging 0.8515*** 0.9082***
(0.078) (0.078)
PosSoftware -0.0704* -0.0581
(0.037) (0.038)
PosBroker -1.7752*** -1.4240***
(0.203) (0.210)
PosAgent -0.1603 0.0484
(0.156) (0.207)
PosAdver -0.0494 -0.0080
(0.049) (0.051)
PosSalary 0.1479 0.0817
(0.125) (0.130)
Reprice -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.000) (0.000)
ReLossDeve 0.1156*** 0.1264***
(0.017) (0.017)
ReLiquidity 0.0044 0.0045
(0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.5180*** 0.5215*** -2.9867*** -4.0090***
(0.037) (0.045) (0.648) (0.673)
Observations 23,669 23,669 23,669 23,669
R2 0.017 0.057
Number of id 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: This table represents the empirical results of the factors that affect risk management on the underwriting
risk of the P&L insurers from 1989 to 2009. The dependent variable is the variable HEDGE, which is the pre-
mium ceded. The first panel consists of the financial considerations on hedging only. The method used in the first
panel is random-effect panel regression. The second panel is the same, but with the fixed-effect panel regression.
The third panel consists of financial considerations, competition, market structure and reinsurance market effects.
I employ random-effect panel regression for the third panel. The last panel is the same as the third panel, but it
uses fixed-effect panel regression.
23
CHAPTER 2
Competitive Edge and Risk Management
2.1. Introduction
Risk management is an integral part of the competitive strategy of insurers. Only a few studies
explore the value added by risk management for firms that have competitive edge in particular areas
of operation over their competitors. One example is the study by Tufano and Serbin (1993) that
finds that American Barrick Resources Corporation hedged most of its gold price risk to reduce its
revenue volatility. American Barrick has an edge of being a low-cost producer of gold. Its average
cash cost of production was less than its competitors’ average. Implementing that operational
low-cost advantage, it hedged most of its gold price risk to focus on being a low-cost gold mining
operator. As a result, it held onto the risk of being a gold mining operator. Risk management not
only helped American Barrick to focus on what it was good at, it helped the company to signal
to the market that it was actually a gold mining company instead of a gold trading company. By
using this strategic risk management, it achieved superior profitability compared to its competitors
during the 90’s and its stock price outperformed its competitors. In the same vein as Tufano and
Serbin (1993), the goal of this study is to focus on how hedging activities by insurers impact their
business advantage. Specifically, this study tries to answer two questions. First, irrelevant to any
competitive edge, does risk management add value to the insurers? Second, does risk management
add value to insurers with a competitive edge?
Insurers should eliminate or transfer the risk that may not have a competitive edge (Froot
(2007)). This implies that risk management activity should go along with the insurers competitive
edge. In addition, Mello and Ruckes (2008)’s theoretical model implies that companies with a
competitive edge have less incentive to hedge than their competitors. By leaving some exposure
to risks, firms with a competitive edge can enjoy a higher chance to gain even more market share
from their competitors. Therefore, leaving some risks, a company can benefit from a competitive
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edge because it has higher chance to win. To explore the competitive edge of insurers, the study
specifies what operations are within an insurance company, similar to the value chain analysis in
Porter (1980, 1985). Berger, Cummins, and Weiss (1997) classify operations of the insurers into
three main tasks: 1) risk pooling and risk bearing, 2) real services relating to insured loss and
3) intermediation. This study focuses on the competitive edge within the risk pooling and risk
bearing operations. I focus on the insurers that have the capability to underwrite policies better
than their competitor. We call this type of competitive edge, “good underwriting”. I capture the
good underwriting capability with two definitions: low loss ratio and low loss development in the
absolute term. Insurers with a competitive edge in the underwriting business tend to hold onto
their risks, as implied by Froot (2007). It is inappropriate to cede the “good risks” that they write
to the other reinsurers.
The study design is as follows. First, it studies whether risk management adds value to insurers
in general. Instead of using a dummy variable to specify which insurers use risk management,
as used in previous literature, I explore how different hedging levels affect the performance of
insurers. In addition, I study how each of these hedging intervals add value to insurers that are
good underwriters. Using the property and liability insurance data for the years 1989 to 2011,
by slicing hedging into intervals, it can give more information about which intervals of hedging
benefited the insurers. On average, using very high hedging proves to be unprofitable to the
insurers. This might be due to the fact that reinsurance is expensive, corresponding to the studies
by Taksar and Markussen (2003) and Froot (2007). Using a very high level of reinsurance purchases
might hurt the profit results. In addition, I find that risk management does not seem to add value to
the insurers with good underwriting skill. High levels of hedging have a negative relationship with
profit. This is in line with the studies by Froot (2007) and Mello and Ruckes (2008) that suggest
insurers with a competitive edge over their competitors have less incentive to hedge or should not
hedge fully. The results are similar when using a continuous hedging variable and controlling for
various specifications.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. First, I explain the competitive edge of
insurers. Second, I discuss how risk management can be implemented to the insurers’ advantage.
Third, I show how to measure the profit efficiency as a performance of the insurers. Fourth, I
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explain the econometric models used in the study. Fifth, I describe the data. Sixth, I give some
results corresponding to the models I specified. Seventh, I discuss the extensions of the study.
Lastly, I summarize the study.
2.2. Competitive Edge of Insurers
There are three main operations of an insurance company according to Berger, Cummins,
and Weiss (1997); the risk pooling and risk bearing operation, real services relating to the insured
losses operation, and the intermediation operation. First, the risk pooling and risk bearing oper-
ation, pools all the risk of the policyholder’s property and liability losses. The insurer holds the
shareholder’s equity capital to bear the risks against the potential losses. Second, real services
relating to insured losses provide a service in processing losses, such as risk surveys, policy coverage
design, loss prevention and settlement claims. The policyholders benefit from the experience of
the insurance company to provide the service. Third, the intermediation operation gathers all the
premiums up-front before paying out the claims, called a float. The float money will be invested
into the securities market to get the investment return on the available funds. This study focuses
the attention on the insurer’s competitive edge within the risk pooling and risk bearing operation.
One candidate for an insurer’s competitive edge is being a good underwriter. Good underwrit-
ers are insurers who have good track record of profitable underwriting over the long term. Some
successful companies in the insurance industry focus their attention on being good underwriters.
For example, Warren Buffett, who is well known for being a successful investor and owns many
insurance companies, such as GEICO, National Indemnity, etc., argues that to be profitable in the
insurance industry, insurers have to focus on implementing a profitable underwriting strategy. In
his annual letter to Berkshire shareholders in 2011, Buffett highlights some basic principles of being
a good underwriter:
“At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1)
understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively evaluate the
likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium
that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are
covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
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Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back
on business that their competitors are eagerly writing. That old line, “The other guy is doing it so
we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance...1”
Economically, a good underwriting strategy can be explained in the following way. Good
underwriters strictly sell the policy’s premium higher than the expected loss. They do not sell until
the price of the policy is high enough. Good underwriters are willing to sacrifice short-term market
share and wait until the premiums are high enough. Loss ratio is a good measure to capture this
action. The loss ratio can be obtained from the A.M. Best annual reports, and it is defined by the
ratio of total losses incurred, divided by the total premiums earned. Hence, we should expect to
observe that good underwriters have a lower loss ratio than their competitors. Most insurers within
Berkshire Hathaway, such as National Indemnity or Berkshire Reinsurance, are examples of good
underwriters. They are conservative in underwriting insurance policies resulting in low loss ratios.
Some insurers might be lucky in a particular year instead of being a good underwriter. We might
observe that they have a low loss ratio in one particular year that could bias our definition of being
good underwriters. To tackle this problem, I average the loss ratio for three years to make sure
that they are good underwriters in the long-term instead of being lucky. I define good underwriters
as having an average of three-year loss ratios that are less than the industry’s average.
In addition, another competitive edge for being a“good underwriter” is to be able to accurately
assess risks. By being able to assess the risks, insurers will have the ability to reserve the right
amount for loss incurred in each accident year. By correctly predicting their loss reserve, insurers
tend to have an edge by having a lower probability of going into bankruptcy, and hence they reduce
their cost of external capital (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998)),
they reduce their predation level (Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)) and they also increase their
prices (Cummins and Danzon (1997)). Every year, insurers adjust their reserves/loss incurred,
corresponding to their prediction of their loss. This adjustment is called loss development. A
long term loss development that is close to zero in absolute terms, indicates that the insurer is a
good underwriter. Insurers with low loss development can assess the risk more accurately, which
results in less loss development for the reserve over time. Therefore, I define good underwriters
1See the 2011 Warren Buffett’s Letter to Berkshire Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., p. 9.
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as having an average of three years of loss development within a specified range from zero. Next,
I discuss how risk management can add value to insurers, in particular focusing on insurers with
good underwriting skills.
2.3. How Risk Management Adds Value to Insurers with Competitive Edge
Risk management adds no value to a firm if there is no friction according to Modigliani and
Miller (1958). However, by introducing frictions into the framework, risk management adds value.
For example, risk management reduces the cost of risk by reducing tax and bankruptcy costs (Smith
and Stulz (1985) and Stulz (1996)), reducing the cost of external financing (Froot, Scharfstein, and
Stein (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998)), reducing underinvestment problems (Mayers and Smith
(1987)). Though, the empirical findings are mixed, enterprise risk management has a positive rela-
tionship to the value, among 118 publicly traded insurers from 1998 to 2005 (Hoyt and Liebenberg
(2011)). Corporate risk management has a positive relationship to the value, among 34 oil refiners
from 1984 to 2004 (MacKay and Moeller (2007)). According to a review study by Smithson and
Simkins (2005), the value of risk management is also mixed. Cyree and Huang (2004), Allayannis,
Ihrig, and Weston (2001), Bartram, Brown, and Fehle (2009), Nain (2005), Kim, Mathur, and Nam
(2006), Allayannis, Lel, and Miller (2004) and Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006) find that there
is evidence that risk management is associated with higher firm value. However, Callahan (2002)
finds that gold price hedging actually has a negative relationship with the value of gold producers.
Lookman (2004) and Jin and Jorion (2006) find no relationship between risk management and firm
value. Though, Lookman (2004) finds that risk management is associated with lower values among
undiversified firms. On the other hand, risk management is associated with higher firm values
among diversified firms.
This study takes a step further than the previous literature. First, it explores how each
level of hedging is associated with firm value. By defining the levels of hedging on liability risk
management as the proportion of insurance ceded, divided by the total premium written, we can
identify the intervals of hedging among insurers. I use these intervals to explore whether they affect
a firm’s value. This is a standard way to measure the level of hedging in the insurance industry
(as in Mayers and Smith (1990) and Cole and McCullough (2006)). This method of measuring
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hedging is different from the previous literature in non-financial companies because most of them
use dummy variables to specify if a firm uses risk management. By using more detail of risk
management, it becomes possible to discover more about the interaction between risk management
and the performance of firms. Second, the study explores how levels of hedging are associated
with an insurers’ competitive edge. To achieve these goals, I use econometric procedures to find a
relationship between each hedging level and the performance of insurers, given that they are good
underwriters.
There are two theoretical frameworks that can explain the interaction between the competitive
edge and risk management. According to Froot (2007), insurers should hedge completely on the
risks in which the insurers do not have a competitive edge. In line with Mello and Ruckes (2008),
the theory suggests that insurers with a competitive edge will have less incentive to hedge compared
to their competitors. The benefit of hedging is to protect a firm from going into a distress situation,
which increases the cost of external financing. However, the benefit of remaining unhedged is that
firms can enjoy a higher chance to gain market share and win over the competition. Firms with
a competitive edge will have a higher chance of having the benefit of gaining market share, if it
remains unhedged. Therefore, it suggests that risk management adds little or no value to companies
with a competitive edge. In this study, I specify good underwriting as a possible competitive edge.
Therefore, I expect to see that risk management does not benefit good underwriting insurers. Next,
I outline how I measure the profit of insurers.
2.4. Performance of the Insurers
In this study, I use the new profit efficiency (NPE) approach to measure the profitability of
each insurance company in each year. The new profit efficiency is different from the standard profit
efficiency because it allows for the differences in price and costs among insurers. The fully efficient
firm will be 1. The lowest efficient firm will be measured as 0. I estimate the profit efficiency
using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), as used by Leverty and Grace (2010). The DEA is
a mathematical program, setup in accordance with Cooper, Seiford, and Tone (2006).
Let e be a vector of 1’s. Let xj be a vector of a company j where xj = (x1j , x2j , . . . , xsj) is
the input vectors of all s inputs. Let y be the output vectors where yj = (y1j , y2j , . . . , ykj) for the
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total k outputs. Let cj = (c1j , c2j , . . . , csj) be the cost of all the inputs. Let pj = (p1j , p2j , . . . , pkj)
be the price of the outputs for the company j. One advantage of using the NPE instead of the
original profit efficiency (PE) is that it takes into account the difference in prices and costs of
the outputs and inputs, respectively. The PE does not take into account these differences. Let
x¯j = (c1jx1j , . . . , ckjxkj) and y¯j = (p1jy1j , . . . , psjysj). Then the formulation of the problem is,
ey¯∗0 − ex¯∗0 = Max
x¯,y¯,λ
ey¯ − ex¯
subject to
x¯ = X¯λ ≤ x¯0
y¯ = Y¯ λ ≥ y¯0
eλ = 1,
(2.4.1)
where λ is a multiplier vector of the problem. The x¯0 and y¯0 are the given data of inputs and
outputs, respectively. The NPE is defined as,
NPE =
ey¯0 − ex¯0
ey¯∗0 − ex¯∗0
. (2.4.2)
I need to consider what the inputs and the outputs of the problem are. Leverty and Grace
(2010) use the valued approach to estimate various efficiency measures of the property and liabilities
insurers instead of the flow approach. The value approach is in line with the traditional profitability
measures, such as return on assets and return on equity. In addition, Berger, Cummins, and Weiss
(1997) argue that the value approach is an appropriate tool to find the profit and cost efficiency
among the different distribution systems of the insurers. Therefore, the use of the valued approach
with DEA seems to be appropriate to measure how well a firm performs. The valued approach of
the inputs and the outputs are summarized based on each year by the Table 2.1.
I screen out the one percent of the biggest and the smallest of each loss category to take into
account the outliers. The price of the insurance loss for each line will sometimes be negative. DEA
calculation does not take into account the negative price of the inputs and the outputs. To eliminate
the negativity of the price in the DEA calculation, I subtract the price of the insurance loss for
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each category by the smallest price in that category. This will eliminate the negativity problem of
the prices. The classification of each category of the loss outputs is similar to Phillips, Cummins,
and Allen (1998) in Table 2.2,
2.5. Econometric Models
This section explains the econometric models used to test whether risk management adds value
to insurers in aggregate and to insurers with a competitive edge. There are four main econometric
challenges that I need to address. First, the data is panel. The data consists of a firm’s variables and
the time period. Second, the panel data is not balanced, which means that the number of unique
ID’s will be different for each year. Third, there might be a firm’s specific characteristic effects.
Fourth, I assume that explanatory variables are exogenous. To tackle all these requirements, I
fit the model using random-effect and fixed-effect regressions. I use the Haussman test to choose
between the random effect and the fixed effect. In the following subsection, I explain the model I
use for each test.
2.5.1. Exogenous Econometric Models.
This section presents the models to test whether liability risk management adds value to a
company. I measure the impact of risk management on the performance of insurers. Model 1 is to
test if each hedging interval has any relationships with the profit efficiency of insurers. The variable
H
(0,25%)
it , H
[25%,50%)
it , H
[50%,75%)
it and H
[75%,100%]
it are the dummy variables if the three-year average
ceding level is within (0, 25%), [25%, 50%), [50%, 75%), and [75%, 100%] respectively2. I analyze
the data using the random effect and fixed effect. I use the Haussman test to test whether RE or
FE is appropriate. Specifically, Model 1 is written as,
• Model 1:
Effit = β0 + β1H
(0,25%)
it + β2H
[25%,50%)
it + β3H
[50%,75%)
it + β4H
[75%,100%]
it + β
cXit + it, (2.5.1)
2Notice that the first interval does not include zero because it is our omitted group of hedging. I eliminate the
negative average ceding level, which contains about 25 observations and the average hedging of more than one which
contains only one observation. Therefore, I have the base case of the average ceding that has a zero hedging level.
These are the insurers that do not use risk management at all.
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where,
Effit = Profit efficiency of each insurer i at time t
H
(0,25%)
it = 1 if the level of reinsurance ∈ (0, 25%) and 0 otherwise
H
[25%,50%)
it = 1 if the level of reinsurance ∈ [25%, 50%) and 0 otherwise
H
[50%,75%)
it = 1 if the level of reinsurance ∈ [50%, 75%) and 0 otherwise
H
[75%,100%]
it = 1 if the level of reinsurance ∈ [75%, 100%] and 0 otherwise
Xit = a vector of all the controlled variables which assumed
to be exogenous for the i th insurer in year t.
I fit this model using the whole sample. In addition, I perform random-effect and fixed-effect
regression on samples given that insurers are good underwriters. For robustness, the study offers
four ways to select the good underwriters. First, the sample consists of insurers that have an
average loss ratio for three years of less than 50 %. Second, the sample consists of insurers that
have an average loss ratio for three years of less than 30%. Third, the sample consists of 10% of
insurers that have an average of one-year loss development for three years of around zero. Lastly,
the sample consists of 5% of insurers that have an average one-year loss development for three years
of around zero3. The coefficients of H
(0,25%)
it , H
[25%,50%)
it , H
[50%,75%)
it and H
[75%,100%]
it will show how
each level of hedging has a relationship with the profit efficiency of insurers. The drawback of this
model is that I needed to eliminate some observations that were not of good underwriters, when
analyzing the impact of hedging on good underwriters. I solve this issue by using Model 2. Model
2 is a slightly different version of Model 1 because it includes the interaction terms between being a
good underwriter and the hedging intervals. By using a marginal effect of each hedging interval, we
can use the whole sample throughout the four definitions of good underwriting. Model 2 is written
as,
3First, I slice the sample by percentile based on a three-year average of one-year loss development, divided by the
book value of the assets. The zero ratio of loss development is at about the 65 percentile. Therefore, I use the sample
that has the loss development ratio from 60 percentile to 70 percentile for the 10% case. I also use the sample that
has the loss development ratio from 62.5 percentile to 67.5 percentile for the 5% case.
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• Model 2:
Effit = β0 + β1GUWit +
4∑
k=1
βk+1H
Ik
it +
4∑
k=1
βk+5H
Ik
it ∗GUWit + βcXit + ψit, (2.5.2)
where,
Effit = Profit efficiency of each insurer i at time t
HIkit = 1 if the level of reinsurance ∈ Ik and 0 otherwise
I1 = (0, 25%), I2 = [25%, 50%), I3 = [50%, 75%), I4 = [75%, 100%]
GUWit = 1 if the insurer is a good underwriter(using 4 definitions) and 0 otherwise
Xit = a vector of all the controlled variables which assumed
to be exogenous for the i th insurer in year t.
Again, we need to do four regressions of Model 2 since there are four definitions of good
underwriting, as previously discussed. The random effect and fixed effect will be chosen based on
the Haussman test. The marginal effects of each hedging level reflect the relationship with profit
efficiency, irrespective of whether insurers are good underwriters.
2.5.2. Endogenous Econometric Models.
There are some possibilities that hedging dummies are endogenous variables. This section
explores this problem by fitting two models that incorporate the endogeneity issues. Model 3 is
the same as Model 1 but specifies all the hedging dummies to be endogenous. Model 4 is the same
as Model 2 but specifies all the hedging dummies to be endogenous as well. I employ two-stage
least squares (2SLS) to fit the model. Therefore, there is a need to find a good set of instruments
that correlate to the endogenous variables and be exogenous to the residuals. I employ Hansen J
statistics to test whether instruments are exogenous. Second, I use the Kleibergen-Paap test to
verify whether instruments correlate to endogenous variables. The possible instruments that can
be expected to correlate to hedging levels, and are exogenous to the residuals, are as follows.
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• ROA: Under an assumption that a company finances its project only with equity, then
it should take the project when the net present value of the project is non-negative. However,
if the capital structure consists of risky debt, then there will be an underinvestment problem,
according to Myers (1977) and Mayers and Smith (1987). If the project turns out poorly from a
financial perspective, then the firm will likely to go into bankruptcy. The firm might want to forgo
some investment opportunities due to the risky debt in the capital structure. Partially purchasing
insurance can resolve this issue to protect the firm from falling into crisis. Mayers and Smith (1990)
and Powell and Sommer (2007) use leverage to test the hypothesis. They expect insurers with higher
leverage to consider purchasing more reinsurance contracts. The higher leverage ratio will indicate
a higher chance for the insurer to go into bankruptcy. In addition, Cole and McCullough (2006) use
profitability to capture the effect of the underinvestment problem. They hypothesize that insurers
with higher profitability will consider purchasing less reinsurance contracts. I use the return on
assets to capture the profitability of insurers.
• Product Type: According to Winter (1994), the price of insurance depends on the types of
the lines of business that each insurer offers. The theory implies that the price of more uncertain
lines is expected to be higher. Therefore, the cost of acquiring reinsurance contracts in those
lines tends to be higher. Hence, the incentive for buying insurance contracts for those particular
lines of business tends to be lower. Therefore, it is expected that product type has an effect
on risk management activity. In addition, elasticity of demand, convexity of production costs
of products influence the hedging activity of firms, according to Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman
(2007). Therefore, I expect each product type to affect hedging activity differently. Mayers and
Smith (1990) and Cole and McCullough (2006) also control for product type in their studies of the
demand of the reinsurance contracts by insurers. Instead of controlling for each line of business, I
categorize the lines into four categories, similar to Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998), according
to the Table 2.2. For each category of business, I define these variables with the net premium
written in each category, divided by the total premium written.
• Market Share: Managers compare their firm’s position to their competitors within the
industry. For example, Fiegenbaum and Thomas (2004) argue that firms use their competitors’
positions and their own position as a reference point before formulating a strategy. Market share is a
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good measure of a firm’s positioning in the industry. According to Sommer (1996), the bigger firms
tend to be healthier than the smaller ones in the insurance industry. This implies that customers
are more willing to buy policies from an insurer with a big market share than a smaller one. It can
charge higher prices than the smaller firms, since it faces lower insolvency risk. Therefore, it has
less incentive to buy reinsurance. According to Mello and Ruckes (2008), firms with a competitive
edge over their competitors tend to hedge less. By having the advantage of charging higher prices
than smaller players in the industry, insurers with larger market share have less incentive to hedge.
• Reinsurance’s Price: Cole and McCullough (2006) conjecture that the price of reinsurance
contracts will have an effect on the insurers decisions to hedge. For example, the shock on the loss
can limit the supply of insurance contracts, as studied by Winter (1994), Cummins and Danzon
(1997) and Weiss and Chung (2004). After a wide loss, the price of the reinsurance contract can
be expected to increase, and therefore, discourage primary insurers from buying the reinsurance
contracts. Furthermore, Cole and McCullough (2006) find that the relationship between the rein-
surance price and hedging levels are negative. This evidence suggests that the cost of reinsurance
will deter the willingness to hedge. I use the ratio of the net premium written to the incurred loss
as the measure for the price of the reinsurers. There is a price variable for each reinsurer. Then, I
calculate the average price of the industry weighted by the net premium written. The variable is
called RePrice.
• Reinsurance’s Development of Loss Reserves: Cole and McCullough (2006) hypothe-
size that the ceding company will buy more(less) if the health of the reinsurers are better(worse).
Cummins and Danzon (1997) also suggest that the price of the insurance contracts will depend
on the credibility of the reinsurers. This is because the insurer has to take responsible for losses
if the reinsurers become insolvent. They need to buy the policies from financially sound policy
sellers. Cole and McCullough (2006) use the loss development to gauge this factor of the insurers’
hedging decisions. However, they do not find any relationship between the risk management level
and the loss development among reinsurers. For this study, I still control for the loss development
to test the health of the reinsurance market. I use the loss development, divided by the total book
value of the assets of the reinsurers for each year to indicate whether the reinsurers are financially
sound, similar to the method used by Cole and McCullough (2006). There is a loss development
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for each reinsurer, and I calculate the averaged loss development for the whole reinsurance industry
weighted by the net premium written. This variable will be called ReLossDeve.
• Reinsurance’s Liquidity: Cole and McCullough (2006) argue that there are two reasons
that liquidity of the reinsurers influences the hedging decisions of the insurer. First, if the overall
reinsurance market has more liquid assets, such as cash and invested assets, scaled by total liability,
on hand, then the whole reinsurance market tends to be more stable. Therefore, this creates more
incentive for primary insurers to buy insurance because of the stability of the reinsurance market.
In addition, liquidity is a sign of excess capacity in the reinsurance market. Hence, reinsurers are
more willing to sell reinsurance to the insurers. The price of the insurance will be low compared
to the lower liquidity environment. Under this excess liquidity condition, we should see that the
insurer tends to buy more reinsurance contracts. However, Cole and McCullough (2006) do not
empirically find any relationship between liquidity of the reinsurers and the level of hedging of the
insurer. I use the liquidity of the whole reinsurance industry to control for the level of hedging
by insurers. Similar to Cole and McCullough (2006), I use the average cash and invested assets,
divided by the total liability to measure the liquidity of the reinsurers. Again, there is a weighted
average sum of this variable by the net premium written. This variable will be called ReLiquidity.
2.5.3. Controlled Variables.
I discuss the possible factors that will affect the performance of the P&L insurers in this
section. The candidate variables associated with the insurers’ performance are as follows.
• Firm Size: The insurers’ size has an impact on the profitability according to the various
literature. Sommer (1996) argues that the healthier insurers, that have a lower probability of falling
into bankruptcy, can charge higher price. According to Liebenberg and Sommer (2008), if the bigger
size insurers have a lower probability of insolvency, then they are able to set their premiums at a
higher price than the smaller firms. Therefore, I expect size to have a positive relationship with
the profitability of the insurers. Browne, Carson, and Hoyt (1999), Cummins and Nini (2002), and
Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) find a positive relationship between insurers’ size and profitability.
I use the natural log of the book value of assets as the measure of firm size. I call this variable
ASSET .
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• Capitalization: Similar to the size of the insurers, I expect an insurer with lower a prob-
ability of falling into insolvency to command a higher price, according to Sommer (1996). If the
higher leverage insurer has a higher chance of getting into the insolvency stage, I expect the higher
leverage ratio to have a negative relationship with the profitability. Liebenberg and Sommer (2008)
find a negative relationship between leverage and profitability4. I use the book value of the total
liability, divided by the book value of total assets as a measure of capitalization. I call this variable
LEV ERAGE.
• Ownership Structure: There are various studies on the relationship among ownership
structure and profitability. There are three types of agents for the insurance companies, which are
policyholders, managers and investors. According to Mayers and Smith (1981), stock companies
have a conflict of interest between investors and policyholders. However, a stock company will
have better control of the management by the owners than mutual companies. Although mutual
companies eliminate the conflict between investors and policyholders, they have a less effective
mechanism for the policyholders to monitor the managers. Berger, Cummins, and Weiss (1997)
find no relationship between the structure of an insurance company and profitability. Cummins,
Weiss, and Zi (1999) find that mutual companies have a higher cost than the stock companies. On
the contrary, Greene and Segal (2004) find no relationship between the cost and the structure of
insurers. Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) find that the mutual insurers will be less profitable than
stock insurers. It is interesting to see how the organizational structure affects the profitability of
insurers. I define STOCK as equal to one, if an insurer is a stock company and zero if the insurer
is a mutual company.
• Geographic Diversification: There are advantages and disadvantages of being geograph-
ically diverse or geographically focused. First, geographic diversification gives an insurer with
lower risk the same expected financial returns. The lower risk implies that insurance companies
can charge higher prices, according to Sommer (1996). However, being a diversified firm can lower
profitability due to the high cost of monitoring. An insurance company that operates in more states
tends to have higher monitoring costs. On the other hand, focused insurers tend to have higher
4Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) use the book value of the surplus, divided by the book value of the total admitted
assets, to arrive at a positive relationship between the capitalization and the profitability. Instead, I use the leverage
as the measure of capitalization. Therefore, the sign of the coefficient will be opposite to Liebenberg and Sommer
(2008) but the interpretation should be the same.
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risks due to the lower number of states they operate in. However, they will benefit from product
specialization and avoid monitoring costs, according to Winton (1999). Therefore, it is interesting
to add geographic diversification as a variable to see how it affects the profitability of the insurers.
Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) find a positive relationship between geographic focus and the prof-
itability. I use the Herfindahl index for each insurer to measure the level of diversification of the
firms. Similar to Mayers and Smith (1990), Choi and Weiss (2005), Cole and McCullough (2006)
and Leverty and Grace (2010), I measure the geographic diversification of the business using the
state Herfindahl index. The state Herfindahl index will characterize the market of each insurance
company in terms of geography. The state Herfindahl index for each company can be written as,
HerfindahlStateit =
n∑
j=1
(% share of direct premium written in state j at time t of the insurer i)2
(2.5.3)
where n is the total number of states. Under this definition, it represents some characteristics.
First, if the HerfindahlState is high, it means the company focuses on particular states at that
particular time. On the other hand, if the HerfindahlState is low, it means the company has
diversified into many states. It is expected to have more competitors from many states than if it
had a higher value of the index.
• Product Diversification: Using the same argument as the geographic diversification, I
also include product diversification in the model. Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) find that more
lines of business will result in the less profitability for the insurers. On the contrary, Meador, Ryan,
and Shellhorn (2000) find a positive relationship between product diversification and profitability.
Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (2000), use different technology assumptions to study focused and
diversified firms and find that the focused strategy is more profitable in some lines of business, and
the diversified strategy delivers benefits to the other lines of business. I use the line Herfindahl
index for each company to capture the diversification of the lines of business. The line Herfindahl
index for each company can be written as,
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HerfindahlLineit =
m∑
j=1
(% share of net premium written in line j at time t of the insurer i)2
(2.5.4)
where m is the total number of lines of business.
• Industry’s Concentration: According to the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) para-
digm, market structure has an impact on a firm’s profitability, according to Liebenberg and Sommer
(2008). A market where there are many competitors will prove to be less profitable for insurance
firms. On the other hand, the firms that operate in more concentrated markets tend to benefit from
less competition. They may collude with competitors and be more profitable. Chidambaran, Pugel,
and Saunders (1997) find a positive relationship between the market concentration and the price
of the insurance. I measure the geographic and product concentration compared to the industry
concentration. More specifically, I use the method developed by Montgomery (1985) and followed
by Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) to capture the industry concentration. First, I calculate the
Herfindahl index for each line of business using the relationship,
Herfjt =
n∑
i=1
(
NPWijt
NPWjt
)2
(2.5.5)
NPWijt is the net premium written for a company i on lines j during the year t. NPWjt is
the particular line j total net premium written in the year t. Then we can find the weight for each
line of business j for each insurer i by,
weightijt =
NPWijt
NPWjt
(2.5.6)
Therefore, the firm’s exposure to the industry competition can be calculated as,
IndHerfLineit =
∑
j
weightijt ∗Herfjt. (2.5.7)
Each firm has its own intensity exposure within the industry. The higher value of IndHerfLineit
means the higher the concentration that the firm i will face, during the year t. In addition to the
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concentration by lines of business, I calculate the concentration by Herfindahl index for geography
as well. I call this variable IndHerfState.
2.6. Data
There are the total of 31,520 observations throughout 1989 to 2011. The study focuses on each
insurer individually, not at a group level. I report the summary statistics of all variables that I use
in the analysis in the Table 2.3. There are 31,520 observations. On average, insurers are about 59%
efficient. The ceding level of the industry is about 36 %. The average loss ratio of the industry is
about 70%. The average one year loss development, scaled by the book value of the assets is about
3.81 %. Next, I will report the findings of the multivariate results.
2.7. Multivariate Results
First, I will discuss the result from the panel regression analysis. Model 1 presents the relation-
ships between the levels of hedging and the performance of insurers, with exogenous assumptions
on hedging dummy variables. Model 2 presents the marginal effects of hedging levels on good
underwriting, with exogenous assumptions on hedging dummy variables. Model 3 presents the
relationships between the levels of hedging and the performance of insurers, with endogenous as-
sumptions on hedging dummy variables. Model 4 presents the marginal effects of hedging levels on
good underwriting with endogenous assumptions on hedging dummy variables.
• Model 1: According to Table 2.4, I fit Model 1 with either a fixed effect or a random
effect based on the Huassman test. The first panel consists of the whole sample. The second panel
consists of the insurers that have a three-year average loss ratio less than or equal to 50%. The
third panel analyzes only the insurers that have a three-year average loss ratio less than or equal
to 30%. The fourth panel considers only about 10% of insurers that have their loss development
weighted by total assets of around zero. The last panel considers only about 5% of insurers that
have their loss development weighted by total assets of around zero. In each column, random-effect
(RE) and fixed-effect (FE) regressions have been used. The Haussman test is performed choosing
either RE or FE. The Huassman tests result in four fixed-effect regressions and one random-effect
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regression. The models include controlled variables specified in the previous sections including year
dummies.
According to Table 2.4, the first panel suggests that purchasing reinsurance benefits insurers
in general. All intervals of hedging are significant and positive. However, good underwriters, who
are defined by having a low loss ratio, benefit less from hedging. The coefficient of each hedging
interval is not always significant according to the second and third panel. Using loss development as
a definition of good underwriting skill, purchasing reinsurance seems to benefit insurers throughout
all intervals. These results suggest that risk management adds value to insurers overall. However,
by being a good underwriter, using the definition of a low loss ratio, there is less evidence that
risk management adds value. On the other hand, by using the loss development definition of good
underwriting, risk management seems to add value to insurers. By focusing on observations of good
underwriters, it foregoes some information due to the drop of observations. For example, according
to the third panel, the study focuses on insurers that are good underwriter, and the observations
drop from 19,394 to 881. The results shown in the panel might be bias based on this small sample.
Therefore, we need to look further at Model 2, where I use the whole sample and use marginal
effects to show the significance of the risk management value.
• Model 2: Table 2.5 finds the marginal effects of hedging levels on the efficiency of P&L
insurers, according to Model 2. These methods use all of the observations to analyze the impact
of hedging levels. There are four ways to define a good underwriter: having a three-year average
loss development ratio that is less than or equal to 50%, having a three year average loss ratio less
than or equal to 30%, about 10% of insurers that have loss development weighted by total assets
of around zero, and about 5% of insurers that have loss development weighted by total assets of
around zero. Random-effect (RE) and fixed-effect (FE) regressions have been used to find marginal
effects for each definition. The Haussman test is performed, and a result I used FE in all cases.
The models include controlled variables specified in the previous section, including year dummies.
The R2 are about 19% in all regressions. The results suggest that all risk management levels add
value regardless of good underwriting. Using the low loss ratio definition as a good underwriter,
the benefit of risk management is lowest at the interval [25%, 50%) for good underwriters. By using
low loss development, the extreme intervals of risk management seem to add more value than the
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medium levels. Next, I endogenize the hedging dummy variables because the hedging might be
driven by other factors. This might result in the effect of risk management on the performance of
insurers. The endogenous versions are in Model 3 and Model 4.
• Model 3: Table 2.6 presents the impact of hedging levels on the efficiency of P&L insurers
according to Model 3. The first panel consists of the whole sample. The second panel consists of the
insurers that have a three-year average loss ratio less than or equal to 50%. The third panel analyzes
only the insurers that have a three-year average loss ratio less than or equal to 30%. The fourth
panel considers only about 10% of insurers that have a loss development weighted by total assets
of around zero. The last panel considers only about 5% of insurers that have a loss development
weighted by total assets of around zero. In each column, two-stage least squares (2SLS) is used to
take into account the endogeneity of the hedging level dummy variables. For each panel, the table
reports the Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test. Instruments are proper under the alternative
hypothesis. The instruments are loss development, tax, return on assets, allocation of net premium
written for each product type, and market share, which I discussed in the previous section. The
instruments are valid when we use the whole sample. The Kleibergen-Paap test gives a statistic
of 13.33 and a p-value of 3.81%. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis that the instruments
do not correlate with the endogenous regressors. The table also reports Hansen J statistics for
the overidentification test. Instruments are proper under the null hypothesis. According to the
table, the Hansen J statistics for the whole sample is 7.80%. Therefore, it cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the endogenous regressors are exogenous to the error terms at the 5% confidence
level. Other regressions do not provide valid instrument tests due to the number of observation
changes. Therefore, I focus my interpretation of the results in only the first panel. According to
the first panel, there is no evidence that risk management adds value for the interval of (0%, 25%),
[25%, 50%), and [50%, 5%). On the other hand, risk management has a negative relationship with
profit efficiency when insurers use a very high level of hedging. Since the study is intended to find
the effect of risk management on good underwriting, we need to use marginal effects in Model 4.
Since we preserve the observations in Model 4, the instruments are still valid throughout.
•Model 4: Table 2.7 presents the marginal effects of hedging levels on the efficiency of P&L
insurers according to Model 4. This method uses the whole sample to analyze the impact of hedging
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levels. There are four ways to define a good underwriter: having a three-year average loss ratio
less than or equal to 50%, having a three-year average loss ratio less than or equal to 30%, about
10% of insurers that have a loss development weighted by total asset around zero, and about 5%
of insurers that have a loss development weighted by total asset around zero. Two-stage least
squares (2SLS) is used to take into account the endogeneity of the hedging level dummy variables.
The instruments are the same as in Model 3 and are still valid under the underidentification and
overidentification tests. The models include the controlled variables, as specified in the previous
section. According to Table 2.7, it appears that risk management does not add value whether or
not the insurer are good underwriters. Using a high level of hedging has a negative relationship
with profit efficiency when insurers are not good underwriters.
The results from Models 1,2 and 3,4 are different by the assumption of the exogeneity of
hedging variables. Therefore, I test whether hedging level variables are endogenous. I use the
Sargan-Hansen test for endogeneity and get a statistic of 471.563 and a p-value of 0.000. This
rejects the null hypothesis that these variables are exogenous. Therefore, I interpret the results
mainly in Model 3 and Model 4 by assuming that hedging levels are endogenous. Overall, risk
management does not seem to add value to the P&L insurers. In fact, it has a negative relationship
with profit efficiency when using at very high level of hedging. This result supports Taksar and
Markussen (2003) and Froot (2007) that reinsurance is expensive due to transaction costs. It is
costly to transfer the existing risk to reinsurers. Therefore, using a high level of hedging does not
benefit insurers in general. In addition, risk management does not seem to add value to insurers
that have a competitive edge. Using a high level of hedging has a negative relationship with profit
efficiency for good underwriters. This is in line with Froot (2007) and Mello and Ruckes (2008)
who suggest that companies with a competitive edge should not fully hedge their risks.
2.8. Extensions
This section extends the analysis from the previous sections. First, it uses a continuous hedging
level instead of dummy variables. Second, it defines good underwriting using the loss ratio, but it
controls for different lines of business. To make sure that it controls the lines of business, I regress
loss ratio on the lines of business variables, which consist of the expense on commercial short-tail,
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commercial long-tail, personal short-tail, and personal long-tail over the total expense. Then I
calculate the residuals from the regression. The residuals that are negative mean that, on average,
insurers write business that has a lower loss ratio than the model predicts. Therefore, it shows their
ability to be good underwriters. I define good underwriters as having residuals less than or equal
to zero. I also define the lower half of the negative residuals as good underwriters. This focuses on
insurers that have much lower loss ratio compared to what the model predicts. Third, instead of
using the current year residual, I use the one-year lagged residual to eliminate the chances that the
residuals will correlate with the incurred loss in the profit efficiency calculation. Lastly, I control
for the group effect. I include the dummy variable, specifying if each insurer belongs to a group.
This way, we can control for the effect of being a member of a group on its profit efficiency. The
analysis still assumes that the hedging variable is endogenous. More specifically, there are two
models that I estimate. Model 5 uses the impact of hedging on the profit efficiency of all of the
insurers, while Model 6 uses the interaction terms with the newly developed loss ratio definitions
of good underwriting. I assume that hedging variables are endogenous. Model 5 and Model 6 are
as follows,
• Model 5:
Effit = β0 + β1Hedgeit + β2Hedge
2
it + β
cXit + ψit, (2.8.1)
where,
Effit = profit efficiency of each insurer i at time t
Hedgeit = 3 year-average level of reinsurance purchase
Xit = a vector of all the controlled variables which assumed
to be exogenous for the i th insurer in year t.
• Model 6:
Effit = β0 + β1GUWit + β2Hedgeit + β3Hedge
2
it + β4GUW ∗Hedgeit + β5GUW ∗Hedge2it + βcXit + ψit, (2.8.2)
where,
Effit = profit efficiency of each insurer i at time t
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Hedgeit = 3 year-average level of reinsurance purchase
GUWit = 1 if the insurer is a good underwriter and 0 otherwise
Xit = a vector of all the controlled variables which assumed
to be exogenous for the i th insurer in year t.
According to Figure 2.1, I plot the point estimates and confidence intervals of the marginal
effects of hedging on profit efficiency. Overall, the result is similar to Model 3 and 4. Ceding
high levels of risk has a negative relationship with profit efficiency for insurers in general. In
addition, ceding high levels of risk evidently decreases the insurers profit efficiency, if they are
good underwriters. In addition to this result, being a good underwriter has a significant positive
relationship with profit efficiency. Moreover, there is evidence that a group variable also has a
positive relationship with profit efficiency given that the insurers are good underwriters, when
using a regression with an interaction term of being a good underwriter and being a member of
a group. Therefore, this suggests that being a member of a group benefits insurers. Controlling
for a group membership though, does not change the overall marginal effect of hedging on profit
efficiency.
2.9. Conclusion
This study explores whether risk management adds value to the P&L insurers. In addition,
it studies if risk management adds value to insurers with a competitive edge. Slicing hedging into
intervals can give more information about which intervals of hedging benefit firms. On average,
using a very high level of hedging proves to be unprofitable for the insurers. This might be due to
the fact that reinsurance is expensive, corresponding to studies by Taksar and Markussen (2003)
and Froot (2007). Insurers might need to carefully consider taking a lot of risk, as thinking that
they can transfer the risks later hurts the profit efficiency of a company.
Risk management does not seem to add value to the insurers with good underwriting skill
and even has a negative relationship with profit efficiency. This is in line with Froot (2007) and
Mello and Ruckes (2008). The literature suggests that insurers with a competitive edge over their
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competitors should not hedge fully. The results imply that managers have to identify if it they
have a competitive edge before they consider hedging, similar to the example by American Barrick
in Tufano and Serbin (1993). By taking these strategic considerations, an insurer can successfully
maximize its own value.
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Table 2.1. Input and Output Variables for Insurer Efficiency
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Input Quantities
Administrative labor 271.04 1704.25 -3472.60 65311.30
Agent labor 342.45 2324.62 -14009.70 83759.55
Materials and business services 1056.70 6497.07 -7865.86 247819
Financial equity capital 1.46E+08 1.15E+09 -3.02E+09 6.93E+10
Policy holder-supplied debt capital 1.76E+08 9.37E+08 -1.95E+09 2.91E+10
Input Costs
Administrative labor 53499.10 12767.83 35273.48 76896.13
Agent labor 42768.25 9831.42 27864.55 57934.36
Materials and business services 47400.90 12686.91 29843.09 71957.78
Financial equity capital 0.105 0.003 0.102 0.113
Policy holder-supplied debt capital 0.057 0.002 0.050 0.059
Output Quantities
Personal short-tail 2.26E+07 2.32E+08 -1.07E+07 9.79E+09
Personal long-tail 2.04E+07 2.50E+08 -1.03E+08 1.38E+10
Commercial short-tail 1.38E+07 7.74E+07 -9.70E+07 3.07E+09
Commercial long-tail 1.80E+07 1.11E+08 -4.72E+08 3.95E+09
Intermediation 3.07E+11 2.36E+12 0 1.15E+14
Output Prices
Personal short-tail 0.827 0.423 0 2.873
Personal long-tail 1.912 1.234 0 10.357
Commercial short-tail 3.910 1.897 0 19.345
Commercial long-tail 14.511 6.783 0 55.773
Intermediation 0.050 0.020 0 0.132
Note: This table consists of all the variables used for calculating the efficiency of each insurer. There are a total of 56,474 data sam-
ples. The variables are the inputs and outputs.
Inputs: Similar to Leverty and Grace (2010), the inputs and outputs are as follows. Administrative labor quantity is the sum of the
salaries, payroll taxes and employee relations and welfare from the Underwriting and Investment Exhibit, Part 3 Expense, divided by
the administrative labor cost. The cost of the administrative labor is from the US Department of Labor NAICS 524126: Direct Prop-
erty and Liability Insurance Carriers. The agent labor quantity is the sum of net commissions, brokerage fees and allowances for agents
from the Underwriting and Investment Exhibit, Part 3 Expense, divided by the agent labor cost. The agent labor price is from the
US Department of Labor NAICS 524210: Insurance Agencies and Brokerages. The material and business service quantity is the sum
of all the non-labor expenses from the Underwriting and Investment Exhibit, Part 3 Expense, divided by the materials and business
service cost. The materials and business service cost is from the US Department of Labor NAICS 524298: All Other Insurance Related
Activities. The available data is from 2001 to 2011, all the expenses from the years 1989 to 2000 are estimated from the growth rate
of the expenses. The cost of the equity capital is the large company stocks’ long-term average rate of return from 1926 up to time t
from the SBBI 2007 Classic Edition Yearbook. The estimated cost of the equity capital of the year 2008 and up are estimated to be
the same as the year 2007. The quantity of the policy holder-supplied debt capital is the sum of real loss reserves and real unearned
premium reserves from the surplus and liability statement. I use the long-term corporate bond’s average annual returns up to time t
from the SBBI 2007 Classic Edition Yearbook to be the cost of policy holder-supplied debt capital. For this version, I use the same
return for the year 2008 and up as the year 2007.
Outputs: According to Berger, Cummins, and Weiss (1997), insurance company operations consist of three types, which are risk
pooling and risk bearing, real services relating to insured losses, and intermediation. The measurement that they use to measure the
risk pooling and risk bearing, and the services, are the present value of the loss This is in line with Leverty and Grace (2010). In addi-
tion, they separate the business into four lines, which are personal short-tail, personal long-tail, commercial short-tail and commercial
long-tail. The short-tail is the unpaid loss less than two years, and the long-tail is the unpaid loss that may be unpaid for 10 to 15
years. The classification of lines is in Table 2.2. Instead of using the present value of loss, I use the current year of incurred losses as
the quantity of the outputs. The price of the loss in each line is defined in Berger, Cummins, and Weiss (1997). The other output is
the investment return. I use the total book value of cash and invested assets as the quantity, and the weighted average return of stock
and debt as the price. The weighted average return is defined by the proportion of stock and debt in the portfolio of each insurance
company. The weight of stock will be multiplied by the long-term stock return, up to each particular year. The weight of debt will be
multiplied by the long-term debt return up to that year. I sum up these numbers to be the total price of each company’s portfolio.
The return of stock and debt, up to the time specified, are from the SBBI 2007 Classic Edition Yearbook. The price of stock and debt
of the year 2008 and up are the same as the year 2007.
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Table 2.3. Summary Statistics of the Data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Eff 0.586 0.406 0 1
CEDE 0.363 0.312 -7.684 18.536
LossRatio 70.851 60.004 -12.658 5005.852
LossDeve 0.038 7.346 -23.283 1303.211
Leverage 0.564 0.205 -0.231 2.249
Asset 17.982 1.986 11.394 25.472
Stock 0.754 0.431 0 1
HerfindahlLine 0.486 0.304 0.068 1
HerfIndLine 0.038 0.023 0.009 0.452
HerfindahlState 0.601 0.383 0.030 1
HerfIndState 0.023 0.017 0.009 0.433
Tax 0.010 0.022 -0.460 0.863
ROA 0.024 0.074 -3.817 4.093
Personal Short-Tail 0.256 0.261 -1.275 10.050
Personal Long-Tail 0.168 0.229 -0.368 6.139
Commercial Short-Tail 0.266 0.342 -16.630 16.061
Commercial Long-Tail 0.280 0.352 -5.964 4.072
MarketShare 0.050 0.287 0 9.138
Note: The data is from the NAIC database from 1989 to 2011. It consists of 31,520 observa-
tions. Eff is the measure of the performance of firms, using the profit efficiency calculation.
CEDE is the reinsurance level of insurers defined by the premium ceded, divided by total pre-
mium written. LossRatio is the loss incurred, divided by the net premium earned. LossDeve is
the one-year loss development, scaled by the total book value of the assets. Leverage is the total
book value of liability, divided by the total book value of assets. Asset is the log of the total book
value of assets. Stock equals one, if it is a stock company and zero otherwise. HerfindahlLine
is the Herfindahl index for individual companies by lines of business. HerfIndLine is the in-
dustry Herfindahl index by lines of business. HerfindahlState is the Herfindahl index for in-
dividual companies by state. HerfIndState is the industry Herfindahl index by state. Tax
is the income tax, divided by the total expense. ROA is the net income, divided by the book
value of the assets. Personal Short − Tail is the net premium written in personal short-tail,
divided by the total net premium written. Personal Long − Tail is the net premium written
in personal long-tail, divided by the total net premium written. Commercial Short − Tail is
the net premium written in commercial short-tail, divided by the total net premium written.
Commercial Long − Tail is the net premium written in commercial long-tail, divided by the
total net premium written. MarketShare is a firm’s net premium written, divided by the net
premium written of the whole industry, multiplied by 100 to make the scale more appropriate.
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Table 2.4. Hedging Intervals and Performance (Exogenous)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable All Observations LossRatio≤ 50% LossRatio≤ 30% LossDeve10% LossDeve5%
FE FE RE FE FE
H(0,25%) 0.0807*** 0.1150** -0.0145 0.4025*** 0.5006***
(0.024) (0.053) (0.045) (0.083) (0.143)
H[25%,50%) 0.0982*** 0.0695 -0.0598 0.4432*** 0.4282***
(0.025) (0.059) (0.053) (0.090) (0.155)
H[50%,75%) 0.1042*** 0.1937*** 0.1062 0.4907*** 0.5219***
(0.026) (0.068) (0.071) (0.097) (0.170)
H[75%,100%] 0.1156*** 0.1643* -0.1015 0.5565*** 0.6360***
(0.028) (0.091) (0.085) (0.106) (0.181)
ASSET 0.0278*** -0.0086 -0.0389*** -0.0006 0.1241*
(0.007) (0.025) (0.014) (0.030) (0.064)
LEVERAGE 0.2966*** 0.0796 0.2679*** 0.0909 -0.1442
(0.027) (0.098) (0.088) (0.122) (0.227)
STOCK -0.0107 0.0358 0.0634 0.0097 0.0315
(0.027) (0.146) (0.064) (0.164) (0.459)
HerfindahlState 0.1220*** 0.2524*** 0.1374** 0.0168 0.1713
(0.021) (0.076) (0.056) (0.109) (0.220)
HerfindahlLine -0.0826*** -0.2091** -0.2089** 0.0799 0.0451
(0.027) (0.088) (0.086) (0.121) (0.222)
IndHerfState 0.3251 -1.1159 0.8343 -0.6214 0.9499
(0.410) (1.345) (1.240) (1.989) (3.094)
IndHerfLine -1.3763*** -1.6417** 1.0867** -0.8937 2.7990*
(0.280) (0.680) (0.470) (0.977) (1.644)
Constant 0.1112 0.3670 0.6552*** 0.3392 -1.9667*
(0.121) (0.432) (0.253) (0.506) (1.074)
Observations 19,394 2,413 881 1,938 971
R-squared 24.80% 14.70% 21.96% 17.80% 15.00%
Number of id 2,453 602 205 1,003 593
Hausman, χ2
(28)
136.48 59.21 33.34 56.01 57.97
P-Value 0.000 0.001 0.223 0.001 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: This table presents the impact of hedging levels on the efficiency of the P&L insurers according to
Model 1. The first panel consists of the whole sample. The second panel consists of the insurers that have a
three-year average loss ratio less than or equal to 50%. The third panel analyzes only the insurers that have a
three-year average loss ratio less than or equal to 30%. The fourth panel considers only about 10% of insurers
that have a loss development weighted by total assets around zero. The last panel considers only about 5% of
insurers that have a loss development, weighted by total assets around zero. In each column, random-effect
(RE) and fixed-effect (FE) regressions have been used. The Haussman test is performed, choosing either RE
or FE. The models include controlled variables as specified in the previous section, including year dummies.
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Table 2.6. Hedging Intervals and Performance (Endogenous)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable All Observations LossRatio≤ 50% LossRatio≤ 30% LossDeve10% LossDeve5%
H(0,25%) -3.2168 1.8496** 3.0899 1.3599* 0.6738
(2.176) (0.726) (2.380) (0.711) (1.171)
H[25%,50%) 0.3139 1.8225* 1.1687 0.9114 0.9122
(1.503) (0.932) (1.786) (0.692) (1.201)
H[50%,75%) -1.1125 -0.4148 5.1910 1.1893* 1.6982
(2.004) (1.244) (8.147) (0.720) (1.271)
H[75%,100%] -8.5888*** -0.8825 12.6801 0.8597 1.8908*
(2.588) (1.368) (14.938) (0.841) (1.063)
ASSET -0.1450*** -0.1576** -0.0062 -0.1545*** -0.1750*
(0.056) (0.069) (0.171) (0.044) (0.104)
LEVERAGE -0.4732 -0.1054 -0.2059 0.4826 0.6001
(0.297) (0.286) (0.759) (0.297) (0.669)
STOCK 0.2789 0.0998 -0.0602 0.1304*
(0.223) (0.280) (0.155) (0.069)
HerfindahlState -0.1410 0.3617* 0.8967 0.0698 0.0730
(0.271) (0.210) (0.609) (0.231) (0.555)
HerfindahlLine -0.0557 -0.1478 0.4474 0.2326 0.5978
(0.287) (0.256) (1.048) (0.275) (0.643)
IndHerfState -7.9863** -1.9253 5.5617 2.5381 5.8707
(3.560) (2.643) (6.307) (3.381) (4.006)
IndHerfLine 5.7330** -3.9501** -5.5832 -0.4909 4.0366**
(2.364) (1.827) (4.598) (1.916) (1.625)
Observations 18,936 2,193 803 1,364 557
Kleibergen-Paap, χ2
(6)
13.332 8.064 2.025 5.123 8.104
P-Value 0.038 0.234 0.917 0.528 0.231
Hansen J, χ2
(5)
7.797 20.390 3.849 34.823 N/A
P-Value 0.168 0.001 0.571 0.000 N/A
Number of id 2,213 427 149 448 192
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: This table presents the impact of hedging levels on the efficiency of P&L insurers, according to Model 3.
The first panel consists of the whole sample. The second panel consists of the insurers that have a three-year
average loss ratio less than or equal to 50%. The third panel analyzes only the insurers that have a three-year
average loss ratio less than or equal to 30 %. The fourth panel considers only about 10% of insurers that have a
loss development weighted by total assets of around zero. The last panel considers only about 5% of insurers that
have a loss development weighted by total assets of around zero. In each column, two-stage least squares (2SLS) is
used to take into account the endogeneity of the hedging level dummy variables. For each panel, the table reports
the Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test. Instruments are proper under the alternative hypothesis. It also re-
ports Hansen J statistics for the overidentification test. Instruments are proper under the null hypothesis. The
instruments are the return on assets, the reinsurance industry’s average price, the reinsurance industry’s average
one-year loss development, the reinsurance’s industry average liquidity ratio, allocation of net premium written
for each product type, and market share, which I discussed in the previous section. The models include controlled
variables, as specified in the previous section.
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Figure 2.1. Marginal Effects of Hedging Intervals on Performance (Extension)
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Panel 2: Low Loss Ratio 1
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Panel 3: Low Loss Ratio 2
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Panel 4: Loss Development around 10%
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Panel 5: Loss Development around 5%
Note: These plots present the marginal effects of hedging levels on the efficiency of P&L insurers, according to Model 5 and
Model 6. This method uses the whole sample to analyze the impact of hedging levels. Panel 1 represents Model 5. Panel 2 to
Panel 5 represents Model 6 where there are four ways to identify good underwriters: having one-year lagged residuals from
regression of the loss ratio on product types less than zero, and the lower half of insurers that have one-year lagged negative
residuals from regression of the loss ratio on product type less than zero, about 10% of insurers that have loss development
weighted by total assets of around zero, and about 5% of insurers that have loss development weighted by total assets of
around zero. The horizon axis represents the hedging level. The vertical axis represents the marginal effects of hedging on the
profit efficiency. The point estimates and their confidence intervals are plotted. The instruments for Model 5 are the return on
assets, the price of the reinsurers, the reinsurers’ loss development and the reinsurers’ liquidity. The instruments for Model 6
are the same except the return on assets. The Kleibergen and Paap statistics are as follows, Panel 1: χ2
(3)
=10.02,
p-value=0.02, Panel 2: χ2
(3)
=23.08, p-value=0.00, Panel 3: χ2
(3)
=21.99, p-value=0.00, Panel 4: χ2
(3)
=25.51, p-value=0.00 and
Panel 5: χ2
(3)
=25.56, p-value=0.00. The Hansen J statistics are Panel 1: χ2
(2)
=4.45, p-value=0.11, Panel 2: χ2
(2)
=3.06,
p-value=0.22, Panel 3: χ2
(2)
=3.05, p-value=0.22, Panel 4: χ2
(2)
=3.77, p-value=0.15 and Panel 5: χ2
(2)
=3.64, p-value=0.16.
Therefore, the instruments are valid under these tests.
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CHAPTER 3
Strategic Groups, Risk Management, Performance and Predation
3.1. Introduction
Various theories (such as Titman (1984), Brander and Lewis (1986), Maksimovic (1988), Bolton
and Scharfstein (1990), Maksimovic and Zechner (1991), Nain (2005), Adam, Dasgupta, and Tit-
man (2007), Mello and Ruckes (2008), Liu and Parlour (2009)) suggest that competition affects
risk management. Indeed, several empirical studies find that competition among firms affect risk
management decisions. However, these empirical studies define pools of competition within the
industry (as in MacKay and Phillips (2005), Adam and Nain (2013)) or specific segments (as in
Zingales (1998)). Even though the industry as a whole affects risk management activity, in a big
industry, such as the property and liability insurance industry, a firm might not consider that every
firm in its industry or even in its segment is one of its main competitors. Even though the nature
of the insurance business is homogeneous, i.e., the insurer collects the premium up front, bears the
risks, services the losses, and uses the collected premiums to invest in productive assets for profit,
the insurance industry is hugely heterogeneous. The industry contains many lines of business and
operates across different states. Insurers with different lines of business have different product types
and different underwriting capabilities to write insurance policies. There are more than 30 lines
of business and more than 50 states to operate in. There should be smaller pools of competition
within the industry, because insurers might not think that all other insurers are their competitors.
This study employs another methodology to explore more direct competition within the industry,
using the “strategic group” principle.
Strategic groups are sets of companies within an industry that exhibit similar characteristics in
some of their key attributes. Firms with similar characteristics are in the same pool of competition.
They might collude or compete with each other. Empirical studies employ clustering algorithms
to cluster firms into groups. The clustering algorithm uses key attributes to find the similarities
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among firms. These key attributes have to be aligned with the management’s strategic decisions
within a specific industry. I use variables such as the lines of business, size, and diversification
as the key attributes for clustering, which follows Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) and follow the
criteria by Chittoor and Ray (2007). These attributes should represent key managerial decisions
of insurers when they formulate their strategy to compete with their competitors. By using this
technique, the study is able to capture more direct competition than the industry level. Using a
crisper way of defining competition is more appropriate to test the implications that derive from
the theories.
The study not only contributes to the financial literature1, but it also adds several dimensions
of strategic group analysis into the strategic management literature. First, there is some debate
whether strategic groups are necessary to be considered when formulating a firm’s strategy. This
study can show that strategic groups are an important factor for a firm to formulate its strategy, if
the strategic group affects risk management. Most empirical studies in the strategic management
literature use performance to show that strategic grouping is an important element of strategic
consideration. However, this study attempts to show that firms might use risk management ac-
cording to their technology investment positioning within their strategic group. Second, the study
is the first to measure the performance among members of strategic groups by using their profit
efficiency. By using this newly developed method of measuring the profitability among insurers,
it properly identifies different levels of performance among strategic groups. Third, most of the
strategic group literature studies small numbers of companies within an industry. It is quite easy
to find some common strategic groups over a period of time. This study however, has more than
1,000 companies in the sample. Finding common groups that exist over a period of time by looking
at the clustering results is a tedious task. Hence, this study offers a new systematic way to classify
which group is a common group that exists over a period of time.
By studying the relationship between strategic groups and risk management, the study answers
the following questions. First, what are the common strategic groups in the P&L insurance industry
over a period of time? Second, which strategic groups outperform the industry’s average? Third,
what is the characteristic of risk management in each group through time? Fourth, which group
1in terms of the effects of competition on capital structure and risk management
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has higher predation levels(as in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990))? Fifth, how do insurers adjust
their risk management, based on their strategic group’s position? Using the property and liability
insurance industry data from 1989 to 2011, there are nine common strategic groups within the
industry. I find that the levels of risk management on debt, reinsurance and the stock proportion
of their investment portfolio are different across strategic groups. There are some groups that show
a higher risk management level than the industry as a whole, and some groups that emphasize
less than the industry. For example, the group that focuses on commercial long-tail insurance and
particular lines of business has a lower leverage and a higher ceding level than the industry level
from 1992 to 1999. After 1994, insurers within special line groups used less leverage than the
industry, as predicted by Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) and Titman and Wessels (1988).
Moreover, performances measured by the profit efficiency are different across the strategic
groups. Some groups outperform the industry’s average either consistently or during a particular
period of time. At the same time, some strategic groups have lower performance than the industry’s
average. For example, the group with large firms that have diversified, by both states and by lines of
business, has a higher efficiency level than the industry average. The group that focuses on personal
lines of business has higher efficiency than the industry from 1993 to 2011. The group that focuses
on commercial long-tail and also focuses on particular lines of business has lower performance than
the industry from 1992 to 1998. I define the predation, according to Bolton and Scharfstein (1990),
using debt level and debt level adjusted by the reinsurance purchased. It shows that the levels of
predation are different across the groups. Insurers in the commercial short-tail group have lower
predation levels in both leverage and leverage adjusted measures than the industry throughout the
SSTP. This means that insurers are exposed to lower levels of predation than the industry average
throughout the SSTP. On the other hand, the group that contains large insurers which diversified
by lines and by states, and the group that diversified by states, and the group that diversified by
lines and by states have higher levels of predation.
In addition, I find that the insurers’ position within their strategic groups influences the use of
risk management. If the investment in its technology deviates from their peers, insurer might have
a greater chance to go into insolvency. However, if the investment in technology is closely aligned to
their peers, the probability of going into insolvency is similar to their peers. There is evidence that
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the positioning of investment on software, broker and salary, all influence risk management activity.
The results suggest that strategic grouping is an important element in formulating risk management
strategy. This result is similar to the findings of MacKay and Phillips (2005), but I use the strategic
group levels to define the competition pools, instead of using the industry level. In addition, there
are some relationships among the risk management tools. Leverage has a negative relationship
with reinsurance purchasing and a positive relationship with stock levels. Stock proportion has a
positive relationship with the level of reinsurance purchasing.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows: First, I review the previous literature and
setup hypotheses on strategic groups, performance, risk management, predation and the insurer’s
positioning. Second, I show the overall study design. Third, I discuss the efficiency of insurance
companies. Fourth, I conduct the clustering analysis to construct strategic groups. Fifth, I describe
the data of the property and liability insurers. Sixth, I discuss the results. Seventh, I discuss the
regression with regards to the relevance of risk management and strategic group positioning. Eighth,
I discuss the robustness of the clustering algorithm. Lastly, I summarize the study.
3.2. Related Theories and Hypotheses
Competition is one of the factors that influences the use of risk management. Theories offer
some explanations. More specifically, Titman (1984) shows that the relationship between firms,
customers and suppliers affect debt level. Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1988) add
product market into the framework to show that it affects debt-level considerations. Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990) argue that firms with a higher cost of external financing might use lower debt
levels, if predation exists. Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) suggest that investments in technologies
among firms affect financial risk management. Nain (2005), Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007)
and Mello and Ruckes (2008) show that levels of hedging of competitors affect a firm’s hedging
decision. Firms with different chances of acquiring new investment projects hedge differently,
according to Liu and Parlour (2009). MacKay and Phillips (2005) and Adam and Nain (2013)
classify firms by industry to find the effect of competition. In addition, Zingales (1998) uses
the trucking industry to find the effect of competition on the survival of companies by segment.
This study, however, uses a different method to define the competition, by using strategic group
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methodology to properly capture the effect of competition on the risk management activity of
insurers.
There are various studies on strategic groups, for example, Cool and Schendel (1987) in the
U.S. pharmaceuticals industry, Kim and Lim (1988) in industries in rapidly developing countries,
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) in the U.S. insurance industry, Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton,
and Kanfer (1995) in the Scottish knitwear industry, Bogner, Thomas, and McGee (1996) in the
European pharmaceutical industry, operating in the U.S., Nair and Kotha (2001) in the Japanese
steel industry, Athanassopoulos (2003) in the U.K. retail grocery industry, Peng, Tan, and Tong
(2004) in Chinese companies, and Chittoor and Ray (2007) in the Indian pharmaceutical industry.
All of these studies identify strategic groups within each industry and then discuss performances
across those strategic groups. However, none have focused attention on the interaction between
risk management and strategic groups.
This study attempts to study the interaction between strategic groups and risk management.
More specifically, it explores five main questions. First, what are the common strategic postures
in the P&L insurance industry? Second, which group outperforms the others? Third, what are
the characteristics of risk management in each group? Fourth, which groups have a higher level of
predation? Fifth, how does positioning in strategic groups affect risk management? In the following
five subsections, I review the related literature, state possible hypotheses and give a possible way
to explore these questions.
3.2.1. Common Strategic Groups.
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) studied strategic groups of 30 leading2 insurance companies
from 1970 to 84. They found three common strategic groups that appeared during the stable
strategic time periods (SSTP). These groups are characterized by looking at the average attribute
values. They characterized the common strategic groups into three categories, which were diver-
sified, life insurance and personal lines. Their study is similar to most other studies of strategic
groups. Most strategic group studies cluster firms using a small numbers of companies. In contrast
to Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990), I use the whole sample of the property and liability industry.
2by asset size in the A.M. Best annual report
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There are on average about 1,000 companies3. By using a large dataset, finding a common group
for each SSTP is challenging. I developed a systematic way to find the common strategic groups
that appear in most of the time periods. The algorithm to find the common strategies is explained
later.
3.2.2. Differences of Performance Across Strategic Groups.
There should be differences of the performance across strategic groups due to mobility barriers
created by members of each group. There are several studies described in the literature that
support the differences in performance across groups, including Caves and Porter (1977), Cool
and Schendel (1987), Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990), Ferguson, Deephouse, and Ferguson (2000)
and Nair and Kotha (2001). In addition, the incumbents aggressively react to the new entrants
in the strategic groups, and as a result the performance among the groups are different (Porter
(1980, 1985), Ma´s-Ruiz, Nicolau-Gonza´lbez, and Ruiz-Moreno (2005), Ma´s-Ruiz, Ruiz-Moreno,
and Ladro´n de Guevara Martinez (2014)). Another explanation might be a characteristic of the
product and the regulations. The groups that focus on different lines of product will have different
risk characteristics. Different characteristics of risk can affect the performance of an insurer. If
a strategic group focuses on particular states, the differences in regulation between those states
might directly affect pricing and performance.
Some studies suggests that the level of performance is similar among strategic groups. This is
because the heterogeneity of performance within a group is far larger than the performance between
the groups. Therefore, we cannot see the different levels of performance across the groups. Cool and
Schendel (1988), Lawless, Bergh, and Wilsted (1989) and McNamara, Deephouse, and Luce (2003)
find no difference in the performance between strategic groups. The rivalry within a group is so high
that the performance can be very different within a group, (Hatten and Hatten (1987), Cool and
Dierickx (1993) and Ma´s-Ruiz and Ruiz-Moreno (2011)). Performance differences within a group
mask the performance differences among the groups. Capabilities in each firm might play another
role in creating differences in performance within a group (Lawless, Bergh, and Wilsted (1989)).
The capabilities of firms can influence their performance and outcast the performance across groups.
In addition, leverage might play a role in the performance of firms within a group. According to
3These companies are group level and individual companies which are independent.
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the literature of the interaction between capital ratio and competition, such as Brander and Lewis
(1986) and Maksimovic (1988), firms take leverage into consideration and produce according to the
leverage level. In addition, Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) predict
a positive relationship between the level of leverage and the level of performance. Brander and
Lewis (1986), Maksimovic (1988) and Rotenberg and Scharfstein (1990) imply that leverage has a
negative relationship with performance. Due to the limited liability of debt contracts, firms within
the pool of a strategic group compete fiercely. As a result, the performance varies within a group
compared to the performance across groups.
It is interesting to see if there are differences in performance among strategic groups using the
efficiency of insurers as a measure. I employed the ANOVA test and the weighted least-squared
test4 to test the differences in performance among strategic groups. Moreover, I used the t-test
to test the performance of each group compared to the industry’s average. This test is performed
for each group in the industry. It is performed for each SSTP. Thereby, allowing us to explore the
patterns of performance and differences across the SSTP.
3.2.3. Demand of Risk Management among Strategic Groups.
After deriving common strategic groups in the insurance industry, it would be sensible to
ask how each group manages its risks. Do we see different risk management activities among
different strategic groups in the insurance industry? There are various studies of companies and
their characteristics that affect the demand for risk management, such as tax and bankruptcy cost,
by Smith and Stulz (1985) and Stulz (1996), the cost of external financing by Froot, Scharfstein,
and Stein (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998), and underinvestment problems by Mayers and Smith
(1987). There are also empirical studies by Tufano (1996), Mayers and Smith (1990), and Cole and
McCullough (2006). However, there is no empirical study based on strategic group levels and the
decision on risk management. It is interesting to see how the characteristics of strategic groups
influence the risk management activities.
There are some studies based on the competition that can affect hedging decisions. According
to MacKay and Phillips (2005), financial variation is within an industry rather than between an
4By using ANOVA test, it is assumed that each group has the same variance. Therefore, I used the weighted
least-square test to take into account the heterogeneity of variance among groups.
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industry. The level of hedging within the whole industry will have an impact on a firm’s hedging
decisions. A firm or a strategic group with bigger-size characteristics tends to hedge more, according
to Liu and Parlour (2009). Brander and Lewis (1986) predict that oligopolies have higher leverage
ratios than monopolists or firms in a competitive market. Firms with special lines of product have
less debt than businesses with more standardized products, according to Maksimovic (1988) and
Titman and Wessels (1988). Lastly, firms in a more concentrated group have a higher and a less
disperse financial leverage level.
In this study, I define risk management using three variables, which are the leverage ratio,
the stock percentage in the investment portfolio and the ceding level. To see the different risk
management levels among groups, I first used the ANOVA test and then weighted least-square for
all groups to see if the levels of risk management are the same for each risk management measure.
In addition, I used the t-test for each group, comparing it to the whole industry. These tests
indicate how each strategic group uses risk management compared to the industry as a whole.
3.2.4. Predation Level among Strategic Groups.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) argue that there exists preda-
tion within an industry. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) focuses on how firms prey on competitors
who are restricted by the costs of external financing. Poorly financed firms will be preyed by cash-
rich firms. After a high-leverage firm is in distress, it is hard to get external financing because its
financing costs are too high. In addition, a firm in distress can become more distressed because
customers are reluctant to buy products from the company, according to Titman (1984). It is a
good time for low-debt firms to prey since the low-debt firms have low costs of external capital.
Therefore, high-leverage firms tend to be preyed upon by low-leverage firms within a strategic
group.
In addition, Poitevin (1989) argues that low-cost producers will issue debt, signaling their cost
structure when they enter an industry. However, a high-cost structure firm is forced to issue equity
because it needs to reduce its probability of insolvency. The incumbents with low levels of debt
will observe the entrants and act aggressively to prey on the high-debt firms. Therefore, studying
the level of predation is vital to understand strategic groups, and vice-versa.
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I define the level of predation among groups by calculating the variance of leverage within each
group. If the variance is large, there might be high levels of preying, and vice-versa. I also measured
the level of predation, adjusting the hedging, using the variance of leverage ratio, subtracted by
the ceding ratio. To test the level of predation, I employed the test conducted by Levene (1960)
and Brown and Forsyth (1974). First, I tested to see if the variances of leverage are the same for
all the groups in each SSTP. Then, I tested to see if each group has a higher or lower leverage
variance than the industry. In addition, I adjusted the leverage by subtracting the ceding levels
and then conducted both tests again. By doing this test, we can explore the level of predations
among strategic groups in the P&L insurance industry.
3.2.5. Firm’s Position in Strategic Group and Risk Management.
Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) imply that levels of leverage are based on different technology
investment decisions made by firms. The study implies that firms that have similar levels of
technology investment to their competitors have similar financial outcomes to their competitors.
Therefore, they can have higher leverage than firms that have much higher or much lower technology
investment than the industry. MacKay and Phillips (2005) show that there is a reverse relationship
of the deviation from the median of the industry’s technology investment and debt level. These
studies are in line with Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1995) where firms use strategic groups as a
reference point to measure how they are doing compared to their peers. The strategy changes
according to their reference point, and this study follows MacKay and Phillips (2005) to find the
relationship of a firm’s position within a strategic group and its risk management activity. I expect
to see a positive relationship between the distance of positioning and risk management. I also
expect a negative relationship between the distance of positioning and risk-taking activity.
In contrast to MacKay and Phillips (2005), the capital usage of insurance companies is ex-
tensively based on human capital rather than fixed assets 5. Therefore, I use five measures of
technology in this study which are 1) total salary, divided by total expense, 2) total agent expense,
divided by total expense, 3) total brokerage expense, divided by total expense 4) total advertising
expense, divided by total expense, and 5) total data equipment and software assets, divided by total
5MacKay and Phillips (2005) analyze the positioning and debt level using non-financial industry companies. They
mainly focus on the use of capital invested in fixed assets such factories or properties.
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assets. Similar to MacKay and Phillips (2005), I define the positioning variable for each technology
by using the following equation:
POSITIONi,j,t =
|technologyi,j,t −median(∀ktechnologyk,j,t)|
max
h
[|technologyh,j,t −median(∀ktechnologyk,j,t)|] . (3.2.1)
where i is for the firm i, j is for the strategic group j, and t is for the year t. This positioning
variable is the measure of how far each company invests in its technology compared to the median of
its strategic group, scaled by the range of the distance within the group. To measure the impact of
strategic groups to the levels of risk management, the following system of equations are estimated:
∆LEV ERAGEij = β0 + β1∆CEDEij + β2∆STOCKij + β
p∆POSITIONij + β
∗∆controlij + 1ijt
∆CEDEij = α0 + α1∆LEV ERAGEij + α2∆STOCKij + α
p∆POSITIONij + α
∗∆controlij + 2ijt
∆STOCKij = ψ0 + ψ1∆LEV ERAGEij + ψ2∆CEDEij + ψ
p∆POSITIONij + ψ
∗∆controlij + 3ijt
(3.2.2)
where ∆ of variables is the change by year. The variable in year t is subtracted by the variable
in the year t − 1 to take into account the fixed effect. For the system of equations, i is for the
company i, j is for the strategic group j, and t is for the year t. CEDE is the level of reinsurance for
each insurer, which is the level of the reinsurance purchases, divided by the total premium written.
STOCK is the stock proportion of each insurer using the level of the book value of stock, divided by
the book value of admitted invested assets. control is the control variables. The control variables
consist of the strategic group level and the individual level, similar to MacKay and Phillips (2005).
I use the EFFICIENCY as profitability and Size to measure the size, which is the log of the
book value of the assets. Diversification measures are the Herfindahl index figures by lines and the
Herfindahl index by states.
First, I estimated the coefficient using OLS regression. I fitted the OLS to each equation.
In addition, I fitted the equations simultaneously. I employed the generalized method of moment
(GMM) and three stage least-square (3SLS). By using the GMM and 3SLS, the coefficient should
be consistent and more efficient than the OLS methodology. The instrumental variables for GMM
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and 3SLS are the second-lagged of the control variables, similar to MacKay and Phillips (2005). I
verified the instruments by using Hansen (1982)’s overidentification test.
3.3. Study Design
The study’s procedures are shown in Figure 3.1. After collecting all the data of the P&L
industry from 1989 to 2011, first, I identified the stable strategic time periods (SSTP). Second,
I used a clustering analysis to cluster insurers into groups for each SSTP. Third, I specified the
algorithm to find common strategic postures throughout the time periods. Fourth, I used the profit
efficiency measure to find the different performances among strategic groups. Fifth, I used risk
management measures to find the different risk management levels among strategic groups. Sixth,
I used the levels of debt and a specified index to calculate the levels of predation among the strategic
groups. Seventh, I used GMM and 3SLS to find a relationship between distance of positioning and
risk management activities.
3.4. Efficiency Measure of the Insurers
In this study, I used the new profit efficiency (NPE) approach to measure the profitability of
each insurance company during each year. According to my knowledge, there is only one study,
by Athanassopoulos (2003), which uses technical efficiency to measure the performances in the
retail grocery industry in a strategic group setting. The new profit efficiency is different from the
standard profit efficiency because it allows for the differences in price and cost among insurers. A
fully efficient firm will be 1. The least efficient firm will be measured as 0. I employ the Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method to estimate the profit efficiency, similar to the method used
by Leverty and Grace (2010). The DEA is mathematical programming, set up according to the
method used by Cooper, Seiford, and Tone (2006).
Let e be a vector of 1’s. Let xj be a vector of a company j where xj = (x1j , x2j , . . . , xsj) is
the input vectors of all s inputs. Let y be the output vectors where yj = (y1j , y2j , . . . , ykj) for the
total k outputs. Let cj = (c1j , c2j , . . . , csj) be the cost of all the inputs. Let pj = (p1j , p2j , . . . , pkj)
be the price of the outputs for the company j. One advantage of using the NPE instead of the
original profit efficiency (PE) is that it takes into account the difference in prices and costs of
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the outputs and inputs, respectively. The PE does not take into account these differences. Let
x¯j = (c1jx1j , . . . , ckjxkj) and y¯j = (p1jy1j , . . . , psjysj). Then the formulation of the problem is,
ey¯∗0 − ex¯∗0 = Max
x¯,y¯,λ
ey¯ − ex¯
subject to
x¯ = X¯λ ≤ x¯0
y¯ = Y¯ λ ≥ y¯0
eλ = 1,
(3.4.1)
where λ is a multiplier vector of the problem. The x¯0 and y¯0 are the given data of input and
output, respectively. The NPE is defined as,
NPE =
ey¯0 − ex¯0
ey¯∗0 − ex¯∗0
. (3.4.2)
I need to consider what the inputs and the outputs of the problem are. Leverty and Grace
(2010) use a valued approach to estimate various efficiency measures of the property and liabilities
insurers, instead of the flow approach. The value approach is in line with the traditional profitability
measures such as return on assets and return on equity. In addition, Berger, Cummins, and Weiss
(1997) argue that the value approach is an appropriate tool to find the profit and cost efficiency
within the different distribution systems of the insurers. Therefore, the use of a valued approach
with DEA seems to be appropriate to measure how well each insurer performs. The valued approach
of the inputs and the outputs are summarized, based on each year, as shown in the Table 3.1.
The prices of the insurance loss for each line are sometimes negative. DEA calculation elimi-
nates the observations containing the negative price of the inputs and the outputs. Therefore, this
study takes into account the insurers that have positive prices for each line. The classification of
each category of the loss outputs is shown in Table 3.2,
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3.5. Clustering Analysis
3.5.1. Attribute Usage.
In order to analyze strategic groups using clustering analysis, we need to be able to identify the
attributes to classify the insurers into groups. This study follows the criteria to choose attributes
provided by Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) and Chittoor and Ray (2007). First, each attribute
has to be subjected to the influence of the top managers of the insurers. Second, it has to capture
the strategy of insurers. Third, it has to reflect strategic choices rather than environmental changes
or the industry’s norms. Lastly, it should allow consistency of measurements across all the firms
in the sample. Considering these factors, I follow the attributes for the property and liability used
in the study by Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) with some adjustments. The attributes are the
scope and the resource deployment, similar to Cool and Schendel (1987). First, the scope attributes
consist of product types, product diversification, and size. There are four product types which are
classified in Table 3.2. For each category, I use the net premium written in a particular category,
divided by the total net premium written in all lines of business. The diversification is by geography
and by lines of business. I calculate diversification using the Herfindahl index for each company.
The Herfindahl index for geography is calculated as,
HerfindahlStatei =
n∑
j=1
(% share of direct premium written in state j of the insurer i)2 (3.5.1)
where n is a total number of states. In addition to the geographic Herfindahl index, I calculate
the Herfindahl index for the lines of business as,
HerfindahlLinei =
m∑
k=1
(% share of net premium written in line k of the insurer i)2 (3.5.2)
where k is an index for each line. The insurer who has a higher Herfindahl index will have
more concentration in a particular state or a line of business.
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Size is the book value of assets for each company. Resource deployment attributes are produc-
tion expenses. There are four key resource deployments in the insurance industry. These attributes
are the broker expenses, agent expenses, advertising expenses and salary expenses. I use the expense
in each category, divided by the total expense. These variables give some ideas of how insurers
allocate resources to particular departments. The variables that I study are risk management and
profit efficiency. Risk management variables consist of the debt level, reinsurance ceding, and the
proportion of stock in the investment portfolio. Reinsurance is the total premium ceded, divided by
the total premium written. The proportion of stock is the total admitted common stock holdings,
divided by the total admitted cash and invested assets. The profit efficiency is the measure of
performance of a firm described in the previous section.
3.5.2. Stable Strategic Time Periods (SSTP).
In accordance with Cool and Schendel (1987) and Fiegenbaum, Sudharshan, and Thomas
(1987), I need to identify the SSTP before clustering the insurers into groups. The SSTP show how
long the structure of strategic groups last over time. According to Fiegenbaum, Sudharshan, and
Thomas (1987), the analysis ignores the change of strategy between periods and the interrelation-
ships among the strategic attributes, if we collapse the time horizon into one period. On the other
hand, clustering firms year-by-year will imply that 1) one year is a strategic time period of the
industry, 2) shifts from one year to another year are meaningful and 3) strategic implementation
of insurers is only one year. This study does not assume the stable strategic time period to be
one year or all the years. It relies on the algorithm to test the stable strategic time periods, in
line with Fiegenbaum, Sudharshan, and Thomas (1987) and Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990). The
algorithm will compare the similarity between covariance matrices of attributes between each year.
More specifically, the strategic groups are stable for the year i to t if the following tests do not
reject the following null hypotheses:
H0 : Σi = Σt
H0 : Σi+1 = Σt
H0 : Σi+2 = Σt
.
.
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.H0 : Σt−2 = Σt
H0 : Σt−1 = Σt
against H1 : at least one equation is not equal (for each H0).
Σs is the covariance matrix of attributes in year s = i . . . t. The test is the Bartlett test
which is a likelihood-ratio test. It assumes that the sample of each year are of multivariate normal
distribution. It uses the likelihood-ratio statistic, which is χ2 distribution, but it can also be
estimated by the χ2 approximation and F approximation. The result of SSTP is presented in the
Table 3.4. According to Table 3.4, there are 15 stable strategic time periods. Out of 15 SSTP,
there are five periods that contain more than one year. One possible explanation to the breaks
between time periods is that there are various catastrophic events interrupting the industry as a
whole. These events force insurers to readjust their strategies. The insurance industry experienced
Hurricane Andrew in 1992, which cost insurers about $27.0 billion, according to A.M. Best (2009).
This coincides with the break of the SSTP in 1992. In addition, insurers experienced another break
in the time periods, which might have resulted from the Northridge earthquake. This earthquake
resulted in about $20 billion in losses, according to A.M. Best (2009). During the years 2003 to
2006, the insurance industry structure did not exhibit a stable structure. Specifically, hurricane
Katrina and Wilma cost the insurance industry about $59.4 billion, according to A.M. Best (2009).
Interestingly, during the financial crisis, insurers had a stable time throughout the years (2007 to
2009).
3.5.3. Clustering Algorithm.
This study uses Ward’s hierarchical clustering algorithm to cluster insurers into strategic
groups, similar to Bogner, Thomas, and McGee (1996) and Short, Ketchen, Palmer, and Hult
(2007). The Euclidean distances of attributes are used to measure the distance between the insur-
ers. For each iteration, each cluster merges with the other cluster which gives the lowest variance
within a cluster. All the attributes for each company are standardized using the Z-scores. There-
fore, the very large or very small values of variables do not overemphasize the clustering analysis.
There are various ways to identify the number of groups. Milligan and Cooper (1985) test about 30
stopping rules and found that Calinski and Harabasz (1974) provides one of the best stopping rules.
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Therefore, I used the index of Calinski and Harabasz (1974) to find the number of groups. Suppose
we have n attributes and k clusters, the Calinski and Harabasz (1974)’s index can be written as,
CHk =
SSB/(k − 1)
SSW/(n− k) (3.5.3)
where SSB is the sum-of-squares between the clusters. SSW is the sum-of-squares within
each cluster. I then picked the number of clusters that maximize the value of CHk. The clustering
became meaningful when we observed the relationships and explained the uniqueness of each group.
During some years, the CHk criteria produced very small numbers of groups. To have a meaningful
clustering throughout the SSTP, I picked the maximum CHk in the range of 8 to 15 groups. After
identifying the groups and the members of each group, I found the common strategic groups that
appeared most frequently in the SSTP.
3.5.4. Common Strategic Group Algorithm.
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) analyze the strategic groups’ formation using the 30 biggest
insurers. By analyzing small numbers of companies, it is easy to see the movement and common
strategic groups within the industry. My study uses all the P&L insurance companies. Hence, with
over 1,000 insurers per year, spotting the common strategic group is not a trivial task. Therefore,
I developed an algorithm to transform the clustering results and find the common strategic groups
throughout the SSTP. First, I found the sample mean of attributes for each group. Since each
attribute is standardized, the sample mean equals 0 and standard deviation equals 1. I labeled
each sample mean for each attribute as 1 if the sample mean is greater than or equal to 1. I labeled
-1 if the sample mean value is less than -1. I labeled the attribute as 0 otherwise. Therefore, if the
group focuses on a particular attribute for that particular year, the attribute is 1. If the group does
not focus on any particular attribute at all, the attribute value will be -1. The result is a table of
-1, 0, and 1 for attributes and for each strategic group. The example can be seen in the Table 3.6.
Subsequently, I put all periods in the SSTP together. I ranked the frequencies that occur for
about more than 50% of the SSTP which is more than or equal to 7.5. I labeled it as a common
strategic group characteristic. The example is illustrated in Table 3.7.
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According to Table 3.7, the insurers that focus mainly on commercial long-tail6 is a possible
common strategic group because it happens for 11 periods out of 15 periods of SSTP. In addition,
the group that focuses on commercial long-tail and particular lines of business7 occurs 10 times.
Therefore, this strategy can be another common group. At the end of this algorithm, I ended up
having nine strategic groups based on the assumption that the group should happen more than
around 50 % of SSTP. Though, there is one strategic group that exists seven times, the main
strategy of that group is to diversify by states. I also included it since it represents a meaningful
strategic group interpretation. The common strategic groups are shown in Table 3.8 within the
results section.
3.6. Data
This study uses the data from the property and liability insurance industry from the NAIC
database. The data is from 1989 to 2011. The data contains all the insurance companies in the
P&L insurance industry. Therefore, there is no sample selection bias. To understand the strategic
decisions of insurers as a whole, the analysis considers the group level, including the independent
individual insurers. I use the group-level data because the strategic group analysis should take into
account the overall strategy, instead of each insurer that belongs to a certain group. There are
19,205 observations. I report the summary statistics for each variable in Table 3.9.
According to Table 3.9, there are two types of attributes that will be used to cluster. The first
type is the scope of insurers. It consists of the product of the businesses, diversification and size. On
average, insurers have about 26% written premiums in the commercial long-tail. They have about
27%, 33% and 12% in the commercial short-tail, personal and specialist business, respectively. The
second type of attributes is the resource deployment. The insurance business is a business that
uses human capital as the main input. I capture the expenses on the brokers, agents, advertising
and salaries as the attributes of resource deployment.
The other set of variables is the risk management. These variables are the leverage ratio,
reinsurance levels and the proportion of stock in the investment portfolio. On average, insurers
6This is when the CL column is 1 and other column is 0.
7This is when the CL column is 1 and the Herf Line is 1 and the other column is 0.
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have about 55% debt ratio. They cede about 25% of the total premium written. In addition,
insurers invest about 12% of their assets in stock and preferred stock. The overall efficiency of the
insurers is 4%. Next, I discuss some results from the econometric analysis.
3.7. Results
3.7.1. Result: Common Strategic Group.
Table 3.8 illustrates the common strategic groups of the property and liability insurers from
1989 to 2011. There are nine strategic groups that occur in more than half of the SSTP.8 The group
that focuses on personal lines appears in all of the SSTP. The insurers that focus on the commercial
short-tail lines appear 14 times in the SSTP. The next group is the large insurers that that have
diversified by lines and by states. This group appears 13 times in the SSTP. The strategic group
that focuses on special lines of business appear 11 times in the SSTP. The strategic group that has
an average of all the dimensions of attributes appears 11 times in the SSTP. The strategic group
that focuses only on commercial long-tail policies appears 11 times in the SSTP. The strategic
group that focuses on commercial long-tail and concentrates in particular lines of business appears
10 times in the SSTP. The other group is a group that diversifies by states and lines of business.
This group appears eight times in the SSTP. The group exists during the time period from 1997
to 2006, except the period from 2000 to 2002, which is after the dot-com bubble. Lastly, the group
that diversifies by states appears mostly in the beginning of the 1990s and disappears afterward.
This group appears seven times in the SSTP. I also include this group because it has an intuitive
interpretation of the group even though it appears for slightly less than 7.5 years.
3.7.2. Result: Different Risk Management among Groups.
This section tests whether the risk management levels (leverage, reinsurance level and stock
proportion) are the same among strategic groups. In addition, I tested if each common group has
higher or lower risk management levels than the industry. First, I tested for the same level of
risk management among all the groups for each year. According to Table 3.10, ANOVA and the
8There are 15 SSTP during 1989 to 2011. Therefore, I pick the common strategic groups that appear more than
eight times.
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weighted least-square tests suggest that there are differences in the level of risk management on
every risk management measure. Next, I tested, for each common group, to see if they used risk
management either more or less than the industry as a whole.
Table 3.11 shows the test of risk management levels for each group compared to the industry.
There are some interesting patterns of the risk management levels among the insurer’s strategic
groups. The group that focuses on commercial long-tail and particular lines of business has lower
leverage, higher ceding levels than the industry, and a higher stock proportion from 1992 to 1999.
The commercial short-tail group uses more leverage than the industry’s average. After 1994, the
special lines group uses less leverage than the industry, as predicted by Maksimovic (1988) and
Titman and Wessels (1988). Even though the special lines group has a lower leverage, it has a
higher stock proportion of the portfolio than the industry after 1994. This suggests that the special
lines group reduces the risk on liability, but increases the risk on assets via increasing the stock
proportion in their investment portfolios. The group for the big insurers that have diversified by
both states and lines has lower leverage than the industry. The group that has diversified by states
has a lower leverage than the industry, when it does not disappear from the SSTP. From 1989 to
1998, the average strategy on every attribute group has more leverage than the industry.
3.7.3. Result: Performance Level among Strategic Groups.
The performance among strategic groups are different. First, I tested the same level of per-
formance among all the groups for each year. According to Table 3.12, the ANOVA and weighted
least-square tests suggest the differences in levels of performance. There are two SSTP that do not
exhibit significant differences which are from 2000 to 2002 and 2005, for the ANOVA test. However,
adjusting for the different performance variances for each group, there is one year when there are
no differences in performance, which is in 1999. Overall, the results suggests that there are dif-
ferences in performance throughout the SSTP among strategic groups. Hence, the result supports
Caves and Porter (1977), Cool and Schendel (1987), Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) Ferguson,
Deephouse, and Ferguson (2000) and Nair and Kotha (2001). Next, I analyze how each group’s
performance is more or less than the industry.
In accordance with Table 3.13, I tested whether each group has a different level of efficiency
from the industry. There are some patterns that can be observed from the tests. For example, the
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group that focuses on commercial long-tail and particular lines of business had lower performance
than the industry from 1992 to 1998. The group that focuses on personal lines of business had
higher efficiency than the industry from 1993 to 2011. The group of large insurers who diversified
by states and lines of business has, on average, higher efficiency than the industry, and this result
supports the theory that diversified companies can generally benefit more by diversifying the risks.
According to Sommer (1996), insurers with lower risk can charge higher prices. Therefore, they tend
to have higher profit than the insurers that do not have as much diversification. In addition, being
large increases the revenue of insurers and lowers the probability of going into insolvency, according
to Sommer (1996) and Liebenberg and Sommer (2008). The group that averaged on all attributes,
posed higher performance than the industry from 1989 to 1998, although the performance of this
group does not persist afterward. In the next section, I analyze the predation levels among the
insurers’ strategic groups.
3.7.4. Result: Level of Predation among Strategic Groups.
According to Table 3.14, there are different levels of predation within the property and liability
insurers throughout the SSTP from 1989 to 2011. Every test shows there are significant variances
of leverage, and the variances of leverage adjusted by ceding level are different among strategic
groups. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) implies that predation within each group in the insurance
industry throughout the SSTP are different. I will now compare the levels of predation in each
group to the industry average.
According to Table 3.15, there is evidence of different predation levels among groups of insurers
in the industry. Insurers in the commercial short-tail group have lower predation levels in both
leverage and leverage adjusted measures than the industry throughout the SSTP. This means that
insurers are exposed to lower levels of predation than the industry average throughout the SSTP.
On the other hand, the group that contains large insurers which diversified by lines and by states,
and the group that diversified by states, and the group that diversified by lines and by states have
higher levels of predation.
Table 3.15 shows some implications for the managers of insurers. It highlights the opportunity
for predators to prey. The predator9 might benefit to move from a low level of predation to a high
9The insurers who have a low level of debt or debt adjusted
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level of predation if the marginal benefits of preying are higher than the marginal cost of moving.
On the other hand, the prey10 might want to move away from the group that has high level of
predation to a low level of predation.
3.8. Relevance of Strategic Groups and Risk Management
This section studies the impact of strategic groups on the insurer’s risk management. According
to Table 3.16, there are two regression methods that I use to find the significant correlation between
risk management and positioning variables. The first three columns represent the OLS regressions.
These results come from the fact that I estimate the relationship equation by equation. To take into
account the simultaneous equations, I use the 3SLS.11 Since there are several endogenous variables
as we previously discussed, I used the two period lagged variables as their instruments. To verify
that the instruments are good instruments, I performed the Hansen-Sargan overidentification test
for 3SLS. The test gives a statistics of χ2(4) = 2.640 and the p-value of 0.6198. This result suggests
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous to the errors. I also
included a dummy variable of the groups as an instrument, but the test rejects the null hypothesis.
Therefore, I used the second-lagged variables to be the instruments of the system. I also included
these variables in the first OLS to fit the regression. The first, second and third columns give the
adjusted R2 of 9.92%, 4.69% and 3.38% respectively. For the fourth to sixth columns, I report the
χ2 values of the test if all the coefficients are zero. I also included the p-value of each equation at
the bottom of the table. In addition, I tested whether the instruments are relevant to each equation
using Shea (1997), similar to MacKay and Phillips (2005). The relevance is small and gives similar
results as MacKay and Phillips (2005).
Comparing between the OLS and 3SLS results, the signs of coefficients in OLS and 3SLS are
different. The relationships between dependent variables in the OLS are different from those in
the 3SLS. Especially for the positioning, the results are different between OLS and 3SLS. Since
3SLS takes into account the simultaneous nature of the system of equations, the coefficients are
consistent and more efficient than the OLS. Therefore, I focus my interpretations on the 3SLS.
10The insurers who have a high level of debt or debt adjusted
11I tried to use GMM to fit the equations, but the method is infeasible with this data. GMM does not converge.
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First, the result supports the finding of Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) and MacKay and
Phillips (2005). According to Maksimovic and Zechner (1991), firms that invest in key technologies
far from their peers increase their risk of going into bankruptcy. In this case, using a higher
leverage and a higher stock proportion are seen as increasing risks. However, purchasing reinsurance
contracts reduces risks for insurers. According to Table 3.16, positioning on software has a negative
relationship with leverage and ceding, and has a positive relationship with stock proportion. These
results imply that insurers with higher deviations than their peers increase their risks by having
a higher stock proportion and a decrease of reinsurance purchases. They decrease their risks by
reducing leverage. The positioning by brokers and salaries exhibit opposite characteristics. This
positioning has a positive relationship with leverage and reinsurance purchases. However, it has
a negative relationship with the stock proportion. These results suggest that insurers that have a
high distance of positioning, increase their risks by having higher leverage. However, they reduce
their risk by purchasing reinsurance contracts and reducing the stock proportion in their investing
portfolio. Overall, these results suggest that insurers use their position within their strategic group
to make decisions on risk management activity.
This study is different from MacKay and Phillips (2005) because I focus on a strategic group
level of analysis rather than the industry analysis. This gives us a closer view of the direct com-
petition among insurers. In addition, MacKay and Phillips (2005) use positioning based on the
investment in properties, which is the fixed capital. It is proper to use fixed capital for non-financial
firms, as in the study by MacKay and Phillips (2005). In this study, however, I look at the position-
ing in terms of the investment in software, advertising, agents, brokers and salaries, because most
assets of insurers are in human capital and data processing. I find that the key positioning is based
on software, broker and salary investments. Investment in agents does not pose any influences on
risk management.
The other interesting result is the interaction between leverage, reinsurance and stock pro-
portion in the investing portfolio. These risk management measures have significant relationships
among them. According to Tufano (1996), Taksar and Markussen (2003) and Hoyt and Liebenberg
(2011), hedging should have a positive relationship with debt levels. Firms with more leverage have
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a higher probability of default, and by using reinsurance contracts they can reduce that probabil-
ity. On the other hand, Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014) argue that debt and hedging levels
should have an inverse relationship. This is due to the fact that firms will have less resources to
collateralize hedging contracts if they have a higher leverage ratio. In line with Rampini, Sufi, and
Viswanathan (2014), I find that leverage and reinsurance purchases have an inverse relationship.
However, the stock proportion in the portfolio has a positive relationship with the ceding ratio.
This supports the idea from Tufano (1996), Taksar and Markussen (2003) and Hoyt and Lieben-
berg (2011) that insurers increase the risk in their stockholdings, but hedge that risk, by purchasing
more reinsurance contracts. Finally, leverage and stock have a positive relationship. This means
that insurers who increase the leverage will increase their portfolio’s risk by purchasing more stock
at the same time, and vice versa.
Overall, there is evidence that the insurers consider their competitive position in the strategic
group’s position. This result comes from the fact that the insurers consider their positioning on
the investment of their employees when making decisions on risk management. In addition, I find
some relationships between several risk management tools. Reinsurance purchase has a positive
relationship with the stock proportion, but has a negative relationship with the debt level. Stock
proportion has a positive relationship with leverage.
3.9. Robustness of Clustering Algorithm
In order to check for a possible bias in the clustering algorithm toward any results of the anal-
ysis, I follow the outline for validating clustering analysis by Ketchen and Shook (1996). First, in
addition to Ward’s algorithm, I used various clustering algorithms to classify insurers into strate-
gic groups. I employed single linkage, average linkage, complete linkage, weighted-average linkage,
median linkage, centroid linkage and Ward’s linkage. The different natures of each linkage is how
we define the distances among clusters and the objective that we use to minimize the distances.
The result is in line with previous strategic group literature. Ward’s linkage seems to produce
the best result. Other clustering algorithms do not classify the insurers in a satisfying way. For
example, most of them classify insurers into about 10 groups. The problem occurs because almost
all the insurers are bundled in one particular group. The rest have a maximum of two members.
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Therefore, Ward’s algorithm is the only clustering algorithm that classify insurers in a more robust
way. Almost all of the previous studies in strategic groups, as far as I know, use Ward’s algorithm
to classify firms. By using Ward’s algorithm, I not only classify insurers in a meaningful way, but I
can also use it to compare to previous studies in the insurance industry that use the same clustering
algorithm, such as Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990).
Second, I use various tests and several variables to test my hypotheses. These variables are
“external” in the sense that they are not included in the attribute for the clustering algorithm.
I employ both ANOVA and weighted least-square tests to compare the mean of performance and
the mean of risk management among strategic groups. I use three variables for capturing the risk
management activity, such as leverage, stock proportion in the investing portfolio and reinsurance
purchase. The tests from these variables give a similar conclusion, that the use of risk management
among groups are different. I employ three tests for the predation level following Levene (1960)
and Brown and Forsyth (1974). I also use two measures of predation level, based on leverage, and
leverage adjusted by the reinsurance purchased. The results from the tests are similar with various
variables. The predation levels are different among strategic groups.
3.10. Conclusion
In this study, I classify property and liability insurers into strategic groups. This clustering
algorithm enables me to robustly analyze the firms’ interaction within the insurance industry.
By using a newly developed measure of performance of insurers, I find that firms have different
performances across the strategic groups, in line with Caves and Porter (1977), Cool and Schendel
(1987), Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) Ferguson, Deephouse, and Ferguson (2000) and Nair and
Kotha (2001). In addition, I show the relationship of product type and the risk management level.
More specialized firms tend to have less level of leverage, as in Maksimovic (1988) and Titman
and Wessels (1988). I define the predation using debt level and debt level, adjusted by reinsurance
purchase. It shows that the levels of predation are different across the groups, according to Bolton
and Scharfstein (1990).
Moreover, I study the relevance of the interaction between insurers at the strategic group level,
rather than the industry level. The result is in line with MacKay and Phillips (2005). There is
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evidence that insurers take their position in their strategic group into consideration when making
risk management decisions. I also find the significant relationships among various measures of
risk management. By looking at these results, they suggest that studying strategic groups gives a
systematic and insightful way to analyze the interaction among insurers, and their implication on
risk management, predation and performance within the insurance industry.
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1. Find stable strategic time periods (SSTP)
2. Cluster insurers into groups
3. Find common strategic groups systematically
4. Test the differences in efficiency among strategic groups
5. Test the differences in risk management among strategic groups
6. Test the differences in predation among strategic groups
7. Find the relevance of strategic group and risk management
Figure 3.1. The chart shows a study design for strategic groups within the P&L insurance
industry, and their performance, risk management, predation and positioning.
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Table 3.1. Input and Output Variables for the Property and Liability Insurer Efficiency
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Input Quantities
Administrative labor 759.732 4320.241 -38.05101 96755.23
Agent labor 935.0175 5734.573 -8509.221 132746.2
Materials and business services 2906.099 16336.63 -1450.674 363087
Financial equity capital 4.11E+08 2.53E+09 -1.19E+09 9.48E+10
Policy holder-supplied debt capital 6.22E+08 2.91E+09 -1.95E+09 6.79E+10
Input Costs
Administrative labor 57115.08 12795.8 35273.48 76896.13
Agent labor 45538.78 9559.086 27864.55 57934.36
Materials and business services 50963.4 12682.68 29843.09 71957.78
Financial equity capital 0.1051299 0.0028322 0.102 0.113
Policy holder-supplied debt capital 0.0576131 0.002035 0.05 0.059
Output Quantities
Special 4.84E+07 3.44E+08 -4.25E+08 1.27E+10
Personal 3.18E+07 1.78E+08 -3.95E+07 5.07E+09
Commercial short-tail 1.29E+08 1.10E+09 -3.19E+07 3.35E+10
Commercial long-tail 8932965 8.50E+07 -2.10E+08 3.58E+09
Intermediation 2.32E+07 4.84E+08 64 3.79E+10
Output Prices
Special -447.867 41850.88 -4165986 1216042
Personal 11.49856 998.7675 -46264.2 81271
Commercial short-tail 214.9567 18792.5 -56357.67 2183837
Commercial long-tail 16.20851 1232.959 -46621.63 108641.7
Intermediation 0.0633397 0.0077534 0.0517734 0.1104425
Note: This table consists of all variables used for calculating the efficiency of each insurer. There is a total of 17,099 observations.
The variables are inputs and outputs.
Inputs: Similar to the study by Leverty and Grace (2010), the inputs and outputs are as follows. Administrative labor quantity is
the sum of the salaries, payroll taxes and the employee relations and welfare costs from the Underwriting and Investment Exhibit,
Part 3, Expense, divided by the administrative labor cost. The cost of the administrative labor is from the US Department of Labor
NAICS 524126: Direct Property and Liability Insurance Carriers. The agent labor quantity is the sum of net commissions, broker-
age fees and the allowance for agents from the Underwriting and Investment Exhibit, Part 3, Expense, divided by the agent labor
cost. The agent labor cost is from the US Department of Labor NAICS 524210: Insurance Agencies and Brokerages. The material
and business service quantity is the sum of all the non-labor expenses from the Underwriting and Investment Exhibit, Part 3 Ex-
pense, divided by the materials and business services cost. The materials and business services cost is from the US Department of
Labor NAICS 524298: All Other Insurance Related Activities. The available data is from 1998 to 2011, but all the expenses from
the year 1989 to 1998 are estimated from the growth rate of the expenses. The cost of the equity capital is the large company stocks’
long-term average rate of return from 1926 up to time t from the SBBI 2007 Classic Edition Yearbook. The estimated cost of the
equity capital for the years 2008 to 2011 are the same as the year 2007. The quantity of the policy holder-supplied debt capital is
the sum of real loss reserves and real unearned premium reserves from the surplus and liability statement. I use the long-term cor-
porate bond’s average annual returns up to time t from SBBI 2007 Classic Edition Yearbook as the cost of policy holder-supplied
debt capital. The costs for years 2008 to 2011 are the same as the year 2007.
Outputs: According to Berger, Cummins, and Weiss (1997), the operations of insurance companies consist of three types, which are
risk pooling and risk bearing, real services relating to insured losses, and intermediation. The measurement that they use to measure
risk pooling, risk bearing and the services are the present value of losses. This is in line with Leverty and Grace (2010). I separate
the business into four lines, which are special, personal, commercial short-tail and commercial long-tail. The classification of lines is
shown in Table 3.2. Instead of using the present value of loss, I use the current year incurred loss as the quantities of the outputs.
The price of the loss in each line is defined in Berger, Cummins, and Weiss (1997), which is the net premium written, subtracted by
incurred loss, all over the incurred loss. The other output is the investment return. I use the total book value of cash and invested
assets as the quantity and the weighted average return of stock and debt as the price. The weighted average return is defined by the
proportion of stock and debt in the portfolio of each insurance company. The weight of stock will be multiplied by the long-term
stock return up to each particular year. The weight of debt will be multiplied by the long-term debt return up to that year. I sum
up these numbers to provide the total price of each company’s portfolio. The return of stock and debt up to the time specified are
from the SBBI 2007 Classic Edition Yearbook. The price of stock and debt for the years 2008 to 2011 is the same as 2007.
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Table 3.3. Attributes Used in Clustering and Variables of Interest
Type Attribute Description
Scope Product 1: Commercial short-tail Commercial short-tail NPW
Total NPW
Product 2: Commercial long-tail
Commercial long-tail NPW
Total NPW
Product 3: Personal Personal lines NPW
Total NPW
Product 4: Special
Special lines NPW
Total NPW
Line Diversification Herfindahl index by lines of business
Geographic Diversification Herfindahl index by states
Size Book value of assets
Resource Deployment Broker
Commission and brokerage expenses
Total expenses
Agent
Manager and agents expenses
Total expenses
Advertising
Advertising expenses
Total expenses
Salary
Salaries expenses
Total expenses
Variables of Interest Debt Book value of total liabilities
Book value of total assets
Reinsurance Premium ceded
Total premium written
Stock Book value of stock
Total admitted invested assets and cash
Performance DEA profit efficiency
Note: This table represents the attributes used to classify insurers into groups. NPW is the net premium
written. In addition, it shows the variables of interests after clustering.
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Table 3.4. Stable Strategic Time Periods of the Property and Liability Insurance
Industry
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Years 1989-91 1992 1993 1994 1995-96 1997-98 1999 2000-02
Period 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007-09 2010 2011
Note: The table represents the stable strategic time periods of the P&L indus-
try. The period is defined using the comparison of the covariance matrices of
attributes. There are 15 SSTP from 1989 to 2011.
Table 3.5. Number of Clusters for Each SSTP
Period 1989-91 1992 1993 1994 1995-96 1997-98 1999 2000-2002
# of Groups 14 14 14 14 12 14 15 9
Period 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007-09 2010 2011
# of Groups 14 14 13 15 10 15 12
Note: The table represents the number of clusters for each stable strategic time period of the
P&L industry.
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Table 3.6. Finding Common Strategy Illustration
Group CL CS Personal Special Herf Line Herf State Asset Broker Agent Adver Salary
1 -0.41 1.40 -0.83 -0.32 0.18 -1.34 -0.12 0.11 0.02 -0.09 -0.05
2 -0.55 1.68 -0.88 -0.34 0.60 0.61 -0.19 -0.12 -0.07 -0.05 -0.31
3 0.41 -0.30 0.12 -0.21 -1.31 -1.85 7.83 -0.11 -0.06 -0.15 -0.29
4 -0.43 0.54 0.02 -0.35 0.69 0.37 -0.18 0.11 -0.18 7.79 1.30
5 -0.57 0.90 -0.61 0.33 0.98 0.27 -0.19 10.00 -0.14 -0.24 0.01
6 -0.57 1.79 -0.96 -0.35 1.27 -1.08 -0.19 -3.22 17.55 -0.30 -0.70
7 -0.51 0.69 0.00 -0.35 -0.08 0.70 -0.18 0.28 -0.08 0.12 3.26
8 1.65 -0.53 -0.66 -0.33 0.05 -0.86 -0.14 -0.24 0.57 -0.16 -0.56
9 2.49 -0.85 -0.95 -0.34 1.18 0.68 -0.08 -0.33 -0.10 -0.11 -0.40
10 -0.38 -0.79 -0.91 2.62 0.72 -1.35 0.06 -0.37 -0.11 0.00 -0.30
11 -0.55 -0.86 -0.96 3.02 1.20 0.59 -0.12 -0.42 0.02 -0.10 -0.66
12 -0.22 -0.37 0.79 -0.33 -0.91 -1.21 0.18 0.09 -0.13 -0.12 0.05
13 -0.56 -0.78 1.52 -0.35 0.11 0.64 -0.16 0.08 -0.13 -0.13 0.12
14 -0.26 -0.01 0.46 -0.35 -0.94 0.66 -0.17 0.08 -0.13 -0.06 0.25
1 0 1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 1 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
6 0 1 0 0 1 -1 0 -1 1 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: This is an illustration of the labeling of the sample mean of attributes in the year 1992 into -1, 0, and
1. The above section is the sample mean of each attribute for each group. The lower section is the labeling
part, which I transform the sample mean value of attributes to be -1, 0, and 1. If the sample mean is less than
or equal to -1 then I label it -1. If the sample mean is more than or equal to 1, then I label it 1. Otherwise, I
label it 0.
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Table 3.7. Finding Common Strategies with Ranking
CL CS Personal Special Herf Line Herf State Asset Broker Agent Adver Salary Year Occurred
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1989-91
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1992
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1993
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1999
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2000-02
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2004
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2005
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2006
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2007-09
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2011
1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 1997-98
1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 2006
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1992
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1993
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1994
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1995-96
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1997-98
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1999
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2004
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2010
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2011
1 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 1994
0 0 1 0 -1 -1 1 0 0 0 0 2004
0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003
0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2004
0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2005
0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2006
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Note: This is an illustration of the ranking to find common strategies throughout the SSTP. This table is ranked
by the commercial long-tail attribute. The group that focuses only on commercial long-tail is a possible common
strategy because it occurs in 11 periods in the SSTP. Next, the insurers that focus on commercial long-tail and on
lines of business occur 10 times. This occurrence is in more than half of the SSTP. Therefore, we can have these
strategies as another common group.
Table 3.8. Common Strategy in the Property and Liability Insurance Industry
Strategy Number of Occurences in the SSTP
1. Focused Commercial Long-Tail + Concentrate on Line of Business 10
2. Focused Commercial Short-Tail 14
3. Focused Personal 15
4. Focused Special Line 11
5. Diversified by Line and By State and Big Size 13
6. Diversified by State 7
7. Diversified by Line and By State 8
8. Average Strategy on Everything 11
9. Focused Commercial Long-Tail 11
Note: There are total of nine common strategic groups that appear in more than half of the SSTP. The left column
shows the characteristics of each strategic posture. The second column represents the number of times that each
group appears in the SSTP.
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Table 3.9. Summary Statistics for the Strategic Groups Analysis
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Attributes for Clustering
Scope
Commercial Long-tail 0.256 0.396 -14.469 8.800
Commercial Short-tail 0.267 0.379 -1.626 15.410
Personal 0.334 0.386 -0.353 2.528
Special 0.121 0.317 -0.053 2.237
Line Diversification 0.610 0.316 0.066 1
Geographic Diversification 0.694 0.373 0.032 1
Size (Assets) 7.84E+08 5.50E+09 55759 1.72E+11
Resource Deployment
Broker Expenses 0.054 0.125 -1.707 2.874
Agent Expenses 0.006 0.041 -0.311 1.949
Advertising Expenses 0.002 0.009 -0.002 0.804
Salary Expenses 0.043 0.047 -0.001 1.871
Variables of Interest
Risk Management
Leverage 0.545 0.230 -0.093 5.002
Reinsurance 0.254 0.260 -1.266 14.281
Proportion of Stock 0.116 0.153 -0.012 1
Performance
Efficiency 0.035 0.184 0 1
Note: The data is the NAIC database from 1989 to 2011. There are 19,205 observations. There are two types
of attributes for the clustering analysis. First, scope attributes consist of product types, diversification and size.
There are four types of products which are classified in the Table 3.2. I use the net premium written in a partic-
ular category, divided by the total net premium written in all the lines. The diversification indexes are by lines
and by geography. I calculate the diversification using the Herfindahl index for each company. Size is the book
value of assets. The second type of attribute is resource deployment. Broker expense is the expense of brokers,
divided by the total expense. Agent is the expense of agents, divided by the total expense. Advertising is the
the total advertising expenditure, divided by the total expense. Salary is the salary expense, divided by the total
expense. There are four variables of interest. Leverage is defined as the book value of the total liability, divided
by the book value of assets. Reinsurance is the total premium ceded, divided by the total premium written. Pro-
portion of stock is the total admitted common stockholdings, divided by the total admitted cash and invested
asset. The profit efficiency is the measure of the performance of a firm, as described in the previous section.
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Table 3.10. Test of Equal Risk Management Levels among Strategic Groups
Period 1989-91 1992 1993 1994 1995-96 1997-98 1999 2000-2002
Leverage
ANOVA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
WLS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Reinsurance
ANOVA 0.227 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008
X *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
WLS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Stock Proportion
ANOVA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.000
*** *** *** *** *** *** ** ***
WLS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007-09 2010 2011
Leverage
ANOVA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
WLS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Reinsurance
ANOVA 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007
*** *** * *** *** *** ***
WLS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Stock Proportion
ANOVA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.095 0.001
*** *** *** *** *** * ***
WLS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Note: This table represents the test if risk management levels are all equal among the groups. There
are three types of risk management. The first measure is capital structure, which is the leverage ratio.
The second is the amount of ceding. Finally, stock is the proportion of common and preferred stock-
holding in the investment portfolio. ANOVA is the test, based on the assumption that the strategic
groups’ variances are the same. WLS is the test, based on the assumption that each group’s variances
are different. *, **, *** are for 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level of significance, respectively.
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Table 3.12. Test of Equal Performance Levels among Strategic Groups
Period 1989-91 1992 1993 1994 1995-96 1997-98 1999 2000-2002
Efficiency
ANOVA 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.101
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** X
WLS 0.031 0.021 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.343 0.005
** ** *** *** *** ** X ***
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007-09 2010 2011
Efficiency
ANOVA 0.019 0.011 0.532 0.001 0.001 0.070 0.051
** ** X *** *** * *
WLS 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.049
*** *** *** *** *** *** **
Note: This table represents the test if efficiency levels are all equal among the groups. ANOVA
is the test based on the assumption that each group’s variances are the same. WLS is the test
based on the assumption that the strategic groups’ variances are different. *, **, *** are for
0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level of significance, respectively.
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Table 3.14. Test of Equal Predation Levels among Strategic Groups
Period 1989-91 1992 1993 1994 1995-96 1997-98 1999 2000-2002
Leverage
W0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
W50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
W10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Leverage-Cede
W0 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
W50 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
X *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
W10 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
X *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Period 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007-09 2010 2011
Leverage
W0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
W50 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
W10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Leverage-Cede
W0 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
W50 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
W10 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
*** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Note: This table represents the test if variances of leverage and adjusted leverage are all equal among the
groups. W0 is the test based on the mean as a central tendency in Levene (1960). W10 and W50 are the same
tests, but they use the median as the central tendency as in Brown and Forsyth (1974). *, **, *** are for 0.1,
0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance, respectively.
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Table 3.16. How does Positioning in a Strategic Group affect Risk Management?
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS
Dep Variable ∆leverage ∆cede ∆stock ∆leverage ∆cede ∆stock
∆leverage -0.0858*** -0.1184*** -1.2567*** 0.6406***
(0.021) (0.016) (0.262) (0.041)
∆cede -0.0360*** -0.0108 -0.7859*** 0.5048***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.098) (0.056)
∆stock -0.0816*** -0.0178 1.5599*** 1.9750***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.118) (0.431)
∆software 2.2481 1.4498 0.9163 -272.15** -344.06** 174.47**
(1.627) (2.512) (1.960) (122.92) (164.97) (78.27)
∆broker -0.0305 0.1822 0.1478 5.2367* 6.6143* -3.3560*
(0.089) (0.138) (0.108) (2.982) (3.980) (1.901)
∆agent 92.8705* 31.1819 -21.5800 1,631.43 2,060.18 -1,045.28
(51.343) (79.279) (61.859) (1,668.18) (2,145.36) (1,065.61)
∆adver -11.6572** -3.1415 -2.7401 303.03 382.69 -194.11
(4.826) (7.453) (5.816) (398.77) (509.95) (254.74)
∆salary 0.1593 -0.0229 -0.0604 21.88** 27.67** -14.02**
(0.138) (0.213) (0.166) (10.37) (13.90) (6.59)
∆eff -0.0041 0.0089 0.0096** 0.5993 0.7623 -0.3846
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.589) (0.741) (0.376)
∆size 0.0756*** -0.0645*** 0.0340*** -1.4323** -1.8145** 0.9184**
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.669) (0.892) (0.424)
∆herfline -0.0529*** -0.0522** -0.0170 -4.9838* -6.3060 3.1953*
(0.014) (0.021) (0.017) (2.956) (3.853) (1.884)
∆herfstate -0.0423*** -0.0381 0.0252 4.8342 6.1069 -3.0977
(0.016) (0.025) (0.020) (3.892) (5.068) (2.483)
Constant 0.0217** 0.0747*** 0.0189 0.1167* 0.1478* -0.0748*
(0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.061) (0.082) (0.039)
Observations 5,447 5,447 5,447 5,447 5,447 5,447
Adjusted R2 9.92% 4.69% 3.38%
χ2 465.42 16.02 490.23
P-Value 0 0.0991 0
Shea (1997) Adjusted R2 0.80% 1.74% 0.03%
Note: This table presents the relevance on the insurer’s position in its strategic group and its risk management
activity. The first three panels are for OLS regressions with the controlled variables. The first panel’s dependent
variable is the differences between the time periods of debt level. The second panel’s dependent variable is for
differences in time for the ceding level. The third panel is for differences in time in the stock proportion of the
investment portfolio. Each regression includes the second-lagged variables. Each of these three panels report the
adjusted R2 value. The fourth to sixth panels are for three stage least-square estimation, which regress three equa-
tions simultaneously. I use the second-lagged variables to be the instruments for the endogenous variables. The
χ2 value represents the statistics of the test, and whether coefficients for each equation are significantly different
from zero for each column. The p-values are corresponding values for the χ2. I provide the Shea (1997) adjusted
R2 to show how the instruments are relevant to the endogenous variables, similar to MacKay and Phillips (2005).
For all regressions, *, **, *** are for 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance, respectively.
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